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Abstract
In Chapter 1, I study the eﬀect of school absenteeism on secondary school students
academic outcomes using the Chilean student strikes in 2011 as a source of exogenous
variation. The strikes, led by university students but promptly joined by hundreds
of thousands of secondary school students, triggered a significant drop in public
secondary school attendance (a decline of about 15 percentage points in all four
grades). Attendance returned to normal levels in 2012. Using the type of school that
students attended in 2011 as an instrument for school absenteeism, I show that school
absenteeism has negative eﬀects on secondary school students’ results in a post-
secondary high-stakes math exam and university enrollment rates. Instrumental
variables estimations suggest that a 10 percentage point decrease in attendance
during secondary school is related to a 9.5 percent of a standard deviation decline
in the math exam score, and a 3.2 percentage point reduction in the associated
probability of university enrollment. I do not find any significant eﬀect on the high-
stakes language exam at the 5 percent level. A key finding is the persistent negative
eﬀect of school absenteeism on students’ academic performance: this negative eﬀect
is present even for those students who sat the high-stakes exams three years after
the strikes had ended, that is, after three years of regular schooling following the
negative shock to their attendance. These results are not driven by inputs to the
education production function that might have been aﬀected by the student strikes,
such as disruptiveness at the time of the high-stakes exams, school environment,
teachers, class instruction, or class size.
Chapter 2 presents the first value-added (VA) estimates for doctoral teaching as-
sistants (DTAs). We focus on the undergraduate program of the Economics Depart-
ment at a UK university, where the match between students and DTAs is random.
We find that a one standard deviation change in DTA quality increases students’
x
test scores by around 8.5 percent of a standard deviation. A novel feature of our
data allows us to examine within-course dynamics in the VA estimates: These are
larger for assessments taken during term-time, drop for end-of-term tests and are not
statistically diﬀerent from zero for final exams. The analysis suggests that the lack
of persistence of the VA measures might be connected with: (i) Students’ endoge-
nous investment responses and (ii) temporal decay in teacher-related human capital.
We discuss how our results can inform the broader debate on the measurement of
teachers quality via the VA approach.
In Chapter 3, we study the eﬀects of a penalty points system (PPS) introduced in
Spain in 2006. We find a 20% decrease in cumulative road fatalities in the five years
after the reform, compared to a synthetic control group constructed using a weighted
average of other European countries. Evidence suggests that the persistent reduction
in road fatalities might not only be driven by deterring risky-driving behavior, but
also by taking reckless drivers out of the roads. Using estimates of the value of a
statistical life, we calculate that the PPS yielded a net economic benefit of e4.6
billion ($6 billion) over this period, equivalent to 0.43% of Spain’s GDP.
xi
Chapter 1
Follow the Leader: Student Strikes,
School Absenteeism and Persistent
Consequences on Educational
Outcomes
1.1 Introduction
School absenteeism is a major concern in the United States education system. Dur-
ing the academic year 2013-14, more than 6 million students skipped 15 or more
days of school,1 which represents approximately 14% of the student population or
about 1 in 7 students (US Department of Education (2016)).2 Even though there
is heterogeneity in the rates at which students of diﬀerent races and ethnicities ex-
perience chronic absenteeism3, it spikes in high school for students of every race
and ethnicity: nearly 20% of the high school students in the United States miss at
least 10% of the school year (US Department of Education (2016)).4 Nonetheless,
concern about absenteeism is not exclusive to the United States. The Trends in
1In the United States, the academic year is about 180 days.
2The Obama Administration launched a variety of national initiatives to improve school atten-
dance, including Every Student, Every Day and My Brother’s Keeper Success Mentor Initiative.
3Chronic absenteeism is defined as missing at least 10%, or about 18 days, in a year for any
reason.
412% of middle school students and 11% of elementary school students are chronically absent.
1
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) conducted in 2015 provides
information about students’ attendance in all 39 participant countries. The inter-
national average of 8th grade students that skipped classes at least once every two
weeks during the school year is 16% (IEA (2015)). The 2015 Programme for In-
ternational Student Assessment (PISA) report confirms this trend (OECD (2016)).
The OECD countries’ average of 15-year-old students that reported skipping at least
a day of school in the two weeks prior to the PISA test was almost 20%.
Empirical evidence suggests that school absenteeism matters, showing that it is
correlated with a variety of outcomes: It is negatively correlated with students’ per-
formance on standardized tests (IEA (2015), OECD (2016)), it is an early predictor
of dropping out of school (Romero and Lee (2007), Connolly and Olson (2012)),
and it is linked to juvenile delinquency (McCluskey et al. (2004)), among others.
Nevertheless, causal evidence regarding the eﬀect of school absenteeism on students’
educational outcomes is scarce.
In this paper, I treat the Chilean student strikes in 2011 as a source of exogenous
variation in secondary school students’ class attendance. The Chilean student strikes
were the largest national strikes in Chile’s history. They were the result of a conflict
during the first semester of 2011 between students and the Chilean authorities about
changes to the education system, which escalated into massive student-led protests
across the country. University students initiated the strikes, but they were promptly
joined by secondary school students. This situation endured for several months,
with hundreds of thousands of secondary school students skipping classes to join
the protests. After extended periods of absenteeism during the 2011 school year,
secondary school students resumed classes as normal at the beginning of the 2012
school year.
The students’ main demand was to change the current market-oriented education
system into a public education system that provides free and high-quality education
at every level (Simonsen (2012)). The protest focused on the public education
system, so it was the public secondary school students who experienced a large
negative shock in school attendance in 2011.5 An average attendance rate over
the 2007-2010 period of about 90% for public school students in every secondary
5A more detailed description of the Chilean school system is presented in Section 1.2.1.
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school grade dropped sharply to 71% in 2011, but then returned immediately to pre-
protest levels in 2012. This drop in attendance was mainly driven by the absences
during July, August and September, a period in which the average attendance rate
of students in public schools fell below 55%. This highlights that public school
students from every secondary grade skipped classes for long and continuous periods
during this school year. In contrast, there were much less significant reductions in
attendance for students enrolled in voucher and private schools.
The Chilean education system uses high-stakes testing to rank students for ad-
mission to selective universities,6 as is the practice in many other countries. These
exams cover the whole secondary education curriculum and are taken shortly after
the completion of secondary school. The combination of the timing of the high-
stakes exams, and the fact that the student strikes aﬀected public school students’
attendance in each of the four secondary school grades only in 2011, allows me to
study the persistent eﬀects of school absenteeism on secondary students’ academic
performance. I use high-quality administrative data containing individual informa-
tion for all secondary school students in Chile from 2003 to 2014.
The strikes introduced large variation in school attendance across diﬀerent types
of schools during 2011. I conduct an instrumental variable (IV) analysis to identify
the causal eﬀect of school absenteeism on academic outcomes, using the type of
school that students attended in 2011 as an instrument for school absenteeism.
Instrumental variables estimates suggest that a 10 percentage points decrease in
school attendance rate during secondary school is related to a 9.5%   decline in the
high-stakes math exam score and a 3.2 percentage point reduction in the probability
of enrolling in a selective university. I do not find any significant eﬀect on the high-
stakes language exam at the 5 percent level.
A key finding is the persistent negative impact of school absenteeism on students’
academic performance. This negative eﬀect is present even for those students who
sat the high-stakes exam three years after the strikes had ended, that is, after three
years of regular schooling following the negative shock to their attendance. This
highlights the persistent eﬀect of school absenteeism: attendance during each grade
6A more detailed description of the Chilean post-secondary education system is presented in
Section 1.2.2.
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of secondary school matters in terms of academic performance. IV estimates suggest
that a 10 percentage points decrease in school attendance rate in any grade during
secondary school reduces the math exam score between 2.3 - 3.2%  , while the
probability of enrolling in a selective university drops between 0.8 - 1.2 percentage
points. This is a sizeable eﬀect: The previous enrollment rate of public school
students in selective universities was around 9.8%, so this is a decline of between 8.2
- 12.2%.
Robustness analysis shows that results are not driven by the sorting of students
across schools following the strikes. I also provide evidence that results are not driven
by the sorting of students across cohorts, induced by an increase in grade repetition
rates in 2011. Furthermore, factors changing at the same time as the student strikes
that only aﬀect public school students or voucher school students may be potential
threats to my identification strategy. I provide evidence that the previous results
are not driven by inputs to the education production function that might have been
diﬀerently aﬀected by the student strikes across public and voucher schools, such as
disruptiveness at the time of the high-stakes exams, school environment, teachers,
class instruction or class size.
My study is connected to several strands of the literature. Previous research has
studied the eﬀect of absenteeism on education outcomes. Most of this research uses
small data sets from university undergraduate programs and focus on economics-
related subjects. Moreover, these articles only study the impact of absenteeism
on students’ contemporaneous performance, but not the long-term consequences
for academic achievement. A common finding is the negative relationship between
absenteeism and students’ performance in academic tests. A key challenge for iden-
tifying this causal eﬀect is the potential omitted variables bias that may arise from
non-observables correlated with both education outcomes and absenteeism. The first
papers use cross-section data, controlling for proxies of students’ ability and moti-
vation, among other covariates (Romer (1993), Durden and Ellis (1995)). Their
evidence also suggests that excessive absenteeism is what really matters. Stanca
(2006) and Martins and Walker (2006) use panel data to account for unobserved
student heterogeneity, obtaining qualitatively similar results.
Some papers exploit exogenous variation in students’ absenteeism in the context
4
of university undergraduate education. Chen and Lin (2008) conducted an experi-
ment in which some course material was randomly skipped in diﬀerent sections of
the same course, and students all sat the same exam at the end of the semester.
Their findings suggest that attending lectures corresponds to a 9.4% to 18.0% im-
provement in exam performance. Dobkin et al. (2010) obtained qualitatively similar
results, using random variation generated by a policy for lower-scoring students,
which forces them to attend classes. Arulampalam et al. (2012) exploit variation
from the random allocation of students in the same course to diﬀerent classes, given
that absenteeism was more prevalent among students allocated to the early morning
classes. However, skipping classes at university might have diﬀerent eﬀects compared
to secondary school.
Few papers investigate the causal eﬀect of absenteeism on school students’ aca-
demic attainments, mainly focusing on the contemporaneous eﬀect of absenteeism
on primary school students. A general finding is that school absenteeism is more rel-
evant for students’ performance in math tests than language or reading tests, which
is also revealed in my results. Gottfried (2010) implements an instrumental variable
strategy, in which the distance that students live from school is used as an instru-
ment for absenteeism. Goodman (2014) uses snowfall variation in Massachusetts as
an instrument for identifying the eﬀect of the time spent at school on achievement
test scores. Aucejo and Romano (2016) jointly estimate the eﬀect of absences and
length of the school year on test results of primary public school students in North
Carolina, by exploiting a state policy that varies the number of school days prior
the tests. The authors also use flu data at the county level to instrument for school
absences.
My study also connects with research that has used student strikes as a source
of exogenous variation. Maurin and McNally (2008) studied the 1968 student riots
in France, establishing exogenous variation that increased the likelihood of spending
a greater number of years in higher education. Because of the conflict between
students and university authorities, normal examination procedures were abandoned
during that year, considerably increasing the pass rate for several qualifications.
Using date of birth as an instrument, the authors find that additional years of
higher education increase future wages and occupational levels. They also find
5
a transmission of the eﬀect across generations, reflected in children’s educational
attainment.
González (2016) uses the Chilean student strikes in 2011 to investigate the role of
networks in collective action. His main finding suggests that individual participation
in the strikes follows a threshold model of collective behavior: students were influ-
enced by their networks to skip classes only when more than 40% of their network’s
members also skipped classes. González (2016) also investigates the eﬀect of the
student strikes on some students’ academic achievement. In particular, he studies
the impact of the strikes on GPA and repetition rates, by comparing students in
primary and secondary school. His findings suggest that repetition rates increased
by around 3.5 percentage points and that GPA decreased by 0.1   in 2011 among
secondary school students. My research diﬀers from Gonzalez’s work in several re-
spects: First, by using diﬀerent standardized tests I am able to analyze the eﬀect
on diﬀerent areas of learning (math and language). Second, in contrast to school
GPA, I use national-level standardized tests which take place at an external location
and are graded by an external institution.7 Thirdly, I also study the eﬀect on the
students’ transition to post-secondary education.8
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the
7A more detailed description of the high-stakes exam testing system is presented in Section
1.2.2.
8My paper connects with previous research that has studied the eﬀect of diﬀerent types of
shocks to instruction time on students’ academic performance. Belot and Webbink (2010) and
Baker (2013) study the eﬀects of teacher strikes on students’ educational outcomes. Herrmann and
Rockoﬀ (2012) and Duflo et al. (2012) study the impact of teacher absences on students’ academic
attainments. Lavy (2015) exploits cross-country variation in weekly hours of instructional time per
subject to study the eﬀects on students’ achievement using data from PISA 2006 tests. Pischke
(2007) studies the eﬀect of drastically shortening the school year while keeping the education
curriculum fixed. His findings suggest an increase in grade repetition in primary school and fewer
students attending higher secondary school tracks among students in schools with a short school
year. My work is also linked to studies of transitory shocks that disrupt the accumulation of human
capital for secondary school students during extended periods. Aizer and Doyle (2015) analyze the
eﬀect of juvenile incarceration on crime and the formation of social and human capital among a
population of juvenile oﬀenders in Chicago, using the incarceration tendency of randomly assigned
judges. They show that incarceration decreases high school graduation by 13 percentage points.
The strongest results are for those aged 15 and 16, a similar age to the students in my sample.
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Chilean education system. Section 1.3 provides background to the student strikes
in 2011. Section 1.4 describes the data sources and Section 1.5 lays out the identi-
fication strategy. Results addressing the impact of the student strikes are discussed
in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 discusses the eﬀect of school absenteeism on students’
academic outcomes, using the student strikes as a source of exogenous variation on
students’ school attendance. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Overview of the Chilean Education System
1.2.1 Primary and secondary education
The Chilean school system is divided into eight years of primary school (1st grade
to 8th grade) and four years of secondary school (9th grade to 12th grade). There
are three types of schools: public, voucher, and private. Public schools are publicly
administered and free of charge, voucher schools are privately owned and receive
public funding per student enrolled via a voucher system, and private schools are
privately owned and do not receive public funding. In 2010, these schools accounted
for 42.1%, 50.8% and 7.1% of student enrollment respectively (MINEDUC (2015)).
The current system evolved out of a reform passed in 1980, changing the school
funding system by introducing a voucher per student. This voucher is directly paid
to public and voucher schools, based on students’ attendance.
The school year is about 180 days. It starts in March and ends in December,
with a two week break in July. Students in 12th grade finish the school year 2 weeks
before the post-secondary high-stakes exams in mid-December.
1.2.2 Post-Secondary Education
Admission to post-secondary education is partly centralized. There are two types
of institutions: selective institutions, the most prestigious universities;9 and non-
selective institutions, which includes some universities, professional learning insti-
9There are 25 universities in the Council of Chancellors of Chilean Universities (Consejo de
Rectores de las Universidades Chilenas (CRUCH), popularly known in Chile as "universidades
tradicionales"). In 2010, selective institutions accounted for 57% of the university enrollment and
17% of the post-secondary enrollment.
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tutes and technical training centers. To apply to a selective institution, students
must take high-stakes exams after finishing secondary education, in which math and
language are mandatory and there are optional exams depending on the degree. Ad-
mission is based on these high-stakes exams and students’ secondary school GPA.
These exams are called Prueba de Selección Universitaria (PSU) and they cover the
whole secondary education curriculum. The examinations take place simultaneously
across the country shortly after the end of the school year. These exams take place
only once a year, and can be taken multiple times, for a fee.10 The high-stakes exams
contain 80 multiple choice questions and are marked electronically by an external
institution.
The post-secondary education system has been widely debated. It has been
criticized for excessive tuition fees, quality issues related to its rapid expansion
and serious problems of information asymmetry, among other issues (Reyes et al.
(2013)). Chile currently has the second most expensive private university system of
any OECD country, after the United States. It is estimated that Chilean families
pay directly more than 75% of the costs associated with higher education, compared
to 40% in the United States and just 5% on average in Scandinavian countries. This
was the background to the student strikes in 2011.
1.3 The Student Strikes in 2011
The Chilean student strikes was a wave of student protests across Chile in 2011,
peaking between July and September. The strikes were a reaction to the market-
oriented education system established in the early 80’s, which has produced large
profits for private supplier institutions and chronic indebtedness for thousands of
post-secondary students (González and Montealegre (2012), Simonsen (2012)).
The strikes were initiated in late April 2011, when more than 6,000 students oc-
cupied a private university to protest after it was taken over by a private investment
fund. On the 28th of April, the association of university students Confederación de
estudiantes de Chile (CONFECH)11 convened the first protest of the year, which
10The fee in 2016 is CLP 28.790 (about US$43.5) and is waived for students from public and
voucher schools who apply for this benefit.
11This confederation brings together students from the Council of Chancellors of Chilean Uni-
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brought more than 15,000 students to the streets of downtown Santiago. At this
time, secondary school students started to raise their own demands relating to the
deterioration of the public school education system. This first protest was followed
by more than 75 others across the country over the school year.
On the 12th of May, a new protest was again organized by the CONFECH,
under the slogan "national strike for saving public education". Again, thousands of
students marched in the streets of Santiago. At this point, the student movement
started to gain followers other than students, while the government suﬀered a drop
in public support (see appendix Figure A.1). A primary demand of the movement
emerged: a public education system that provides free and high-quality education
at every level (Simonsen (2012)).
Figure 1.1: Average monthly attendance rates in 12th grade
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Notes: The figure plots the average monthly attendance rates in 12th grade during the academic
years 2011-2014.
In June, the situation climaxed: Universities were occupied, dozens of schools
were on strike or shut down, and protesters flooded streets throughout the country,
with more than 400,000 people demonstrating. Hundreds of thousands of secondary
school students skipped classes to join the strikes. Figure 1.1 shows the monthly
versities, whose students are organized in democratically elected federations.
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attendance rates of 12th grade students over time.12 Appendix Figure A.2 provides
the monthly attendance rates for 9th, 10th and 11th grade students. The pattern is
the same: attendance of public secondary school students in all four grades dropped
sharply during the period of the strikes, but immediately recovered by 2012, once
the strikes were over. At the peak of the strikes (July, August and September of
2011), attendance of public secondary school students fell below 55%. There was
hardly any drop in attendance at voucher schools, showing that public secondary
school students were the active participants in the strikes.13
Around October the movement started to decay, as the end of the school year
drew closer. The year ended without a clear agreement between the Government
and the students.
1.4 Data
The data includes administrative records for individual-level secondary school en-
rollment, high-stakes exams test scores and university enrollment for 2003 to 2014.
The first data source is the Chilean Students’ Registry, which contains the complete
population of students and is administered by the Ministry of Education. It pro-
vides information about basic demographics for each student, their annual average
attendance, GPA14 and the school each student was enrolled in. From 2011 onwards,
it includes students’ monthly average attendance.
The second source is the registry of students who enroll for the PSU test. This is
census data provided by DEMRE (the Department of Educational Evaluation, Mea-
surement and Recording), which depends on the Council of Chancellors of Chilean
Universities. The variables I use in my analysis are individual data on PSU scores,15
and the outcomes of the applications for post-secondary placement. The third data
12Public and voucher schools report the students’ daily attendance to the Ministry of Education
monthly, and schools receive public funds based on this information. To ensure the veracity of
these reports, there is a permanent audit process.
13Appendix Figure A.3 provides the school attendance’s distribution at student and school level
during the academic year 2011.
14GPA is a continuous variable that goes from 1 to 7.
15PSU scores are normalized to a distribution with mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 110
to enable comparison between years. The scores range from 150 to 850 points.
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source is the Chilean Teachers’ Registry, which contains the complete population
of teachers in the school system. This data is administered by the Ministry of Ed-
ucation and provides basic demographics for each teacher and their qualifications.
The last source corresponds to teachers’ 8th grade SIMCE questionnaires,16 that
provides information about a variety of school environment measures for the years
2009, 2011, 2013 and 2014. This data is administrated by the Quality Assurance
Agency for Education
The data is merged using individual national identification numbers provided for
students, teachers and schools.
Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics for 12th grade students nationwide from
2007 to 2010, organized by type of school administration. Public school students
have a slightly lower average attendance rate, a lower average take-up rate of high-
stakes exams, perform worse in those exams, and fewer of them enroll in selective
universities.
Over the pre-strike period, private schools account for 8.14%, voucher schools
account for 45.26%, and public schools account for 46.60% of enrollment of 12th
grade students.
1.5 Identification
1.5.1 Estimating the eﬀect of school absenteeism
Using this data set, I estimate the eﬀect of school absenteeism on secondary school
students’ academic outcomes with the following regression model:
Outcomeis2011r2011t = ↵s2011 +  r2011t + ⇢Absenteeismis2011r2011t+
X
0
is2011r2011t'+ ✏is2011r2011t
(1.1)
16SIMCE (Sistema de Medición de la Calidad de la Educación) is a battery of standardized
tests taken some years in specific grades and it is used to measure certain aspects of the school
curriculum. In addition to the tests, questionnaires are provided to students, parents and teachers,
to collect information regarding specific subjects.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics for 12th grade students over the period 2007-2010
Private Voucher Public
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Students Characteristics
Female (%) 49.10 52.90 51.92
Yearly attendance rate 92.99 6.91 91.82 7.78 89.97 8.62
12th grade GPA 6.01 0.52 5.53 0.56 5.48 0.56
Repetition rate (%) 0.27 1.87 2.68
PSU: take-up rate (%) 97.45 76.77 64.16
PSU: math test score (standardized) 1.26 0.82 0.08 0.89 -0.23 0.90
PSU: language test score (standardized) 1.17 0.81 0.10 0.89 -0.24 0.93
Enrollment rate in selective universities (%) 35.63 15.28 9.73
Size of the cohort 16,549.46 124.5 92,025.25 1,570.67 94,735.75 2,729.92
Schools Characteristics
Class Size 24.58 7.32 31.88 10.30 31.60 11.18
Rural (%) 2.91 6.38 9.96
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Here the subscript i refers to student, s refers to the school, r refers to the
region, and t refers to the year. Outcomes of interest are students’ high-stakes
exams scores in math and language, and university enrollment. Students’ high-
stakes exams results are standardized within each year and university enrollment
is measured with an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the student
was enrolled in a selective university right after school graduation.17. I focus my
regression analysis on two types of students: public secondary school students and
voucher secondary school students.18
In Equation (1.1), I regress students’ academic outcomes on students’ school
absenteeism rate during secondary school. The analysis focuses on ⇢, which indi-
cates the average eﬀect of school absenteeism on students’ outcomes. I control for
measures of students’ ability using their rank position in their class 4 years before
sitting the high-stakes exams.19 As the last cohort of 12th grade students I use in the
analysis is the 2014 cohort, this measure was fixed before the strikes for all cohorts
included in the analysis. The other student-level control used is a gender dummy. I
also control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across schools by including
school fixed eﬀects. In addition, to account for potential heterogeneous regional
responses to temporal shocks I include region ⇥ year fixed eﬀects.
1.5.2 Using the student strikes as instrument for school ab-
senteeism
Estimating Equation (1.1) using ordinary least squares (OLS) would lead to a biased
estimate of ⇢. Omitted variables could be a source of bias. For instance, more able
and motivated students are more likely to attend school and to perform well on tests.
17As discussed in Section 1.2.2, students are allowed to sit high-stakes exams more than once,
and to apply to a major degree as many times as they wish.
18I decided to exclude private secondary school students from the sample for two reasons: (i)
Private school students represent a very small proportion of the total of secondary school students
and; (ii) family backgrounds of private school students are very diﬀerent from the rest of the
student population. Their families can aﬀord very expensive fees for private education. Thus,
strikes might have diﬀerently aﬀected their unobserved characteristics in comparison to the rest of
secondary school students.
19This measure of students’ past performance is a continuous variable that goes from 0 to 100.
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To tackle this problem, I use the type of school that students were attending in 2011
to instrument students’ school absenteeism during secondary school, taking advan-
tage of the large variation introduced by the student strikes in school attendance
across diﬀerent types of schools during 2011.
Appendix Figure A.5 shows the students’ attendance rates during secondary
school, displaying a sharp decline public school students’ attendance rates imme-
diately after the strikes which remains throughout the post-strike period. This is
because school attendance for all post-strike cohorts of 12th grade students was sim-
ilarly aﬀected by the strikes in 2011, even though in 2011 they were enrolled in
diﬀerent grades of secondary education.
The first-stage regression is:
Absenteeismis2011r2011t = ↵s2011 +  r2011t +  (Publics ⇥ 2011t)+
X
0
is2011r2011t'+ &is2011r2011t
(1.2)
In Equation (1.2), the instrument for school absenteeism during secondary school
is (Publics⇥2011t), which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the student
attended a public school in 2011, 0 otherwise.
For each student in cohorts after 2011, I assign the school (and therefore also
the region) attended in 2011. For these students I decided to fix the school they
attended in the year of the strikes, given that the choice of the school on which they
graduate from 12th grade is endogenous. As the eﬀect of the student strikes is likely
to be correlated within schools, I account for any dependence between observations
of students within the same school by clustering all regression results at the school
level.
Using the student strikes as an instrumental variable relies on the assumption
that the student strikes only aﬀected secondary school students’ academic outcomes
through the eﬀect on students’ school absenteeism. It is worth mentioning that any
factor aﬀecting public and voucher secondary school students in the same way will
be captured by the year fixed eﬀects and would thus not invalidate the identification
strategy. Thus, only factors changing at the same time as the student strikes that
only aﬀect public school students or voucher school students may be potential threats
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to the identification strategy. I will discuss potential factors in Section 1.7.3.
1.6 The Eﬀect of the Student Strikes
I begin the empirical analysis by studying the eﬀect of the strikes on students’
school attendance. Figure 1.1 and appendix Figure A.2 show that the drop in the
monthly attendance rate of public secondary school students in all four grades is
very large in comparison to voucher secondary school students during the strikes,
but immediately recovered in 2012 when the strikes had ended. At the peak of the
strikes (July, August and September), the relative fall in monthly attendance was
more than 30 percentage points.
However, high-stakes exams and university enrollment happen once a year, at the
end of the school year. Appendix Figure A.4 presents the yearly attendance rates of
secondary school students by grade. Again, attendance rates follow a similar pattern
across the diﬀerent grades of secondary school. The average yearly attendance rate
of students in public secondary schools dropped sharply in 2011, but immediately
recovered in 2012. To estimate the eﬀect of the student strikes on the yearly at-
tendance of public secondary school students compared to voucher secondary school
students, I regress students’ yearly attendance on the interaction between 2011t,
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 in year 2011, and Publics, another
indicator variable that is 1 if the student attends a public school. I control for school
fixed eﬀects, region ⇥ year fixed eﬀects, and the student-level controls.
Y earlyAttendanceisrt = ↵s +  rt + '(2011t ⇥ Publics) + X0irst'+  isrt (1.3)
Regression results of Equation (1.3) are presented in Table 1.2. Column 1 shows
the eﬀect of the student strikes on the yearly attendance rate of 9th grade public
school students, Column 2 shows the results for 10th grade public school students,
Column 3 shows the results for 11th grade public school students, and Column 4
shows the results for 12th grade public school students. Estimates reveal a significant
reduction in the yearly attendance rate of public secondary school students in all
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Table 1.2: Eﬀect of the student strikes on public school students’ yearly attendance in
2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
9th Grade 10th Grade 11th Grade 12th Grade
public ⇥ 2011 -14.87*** -14.91*** -15.35*** -14.34***
(0.888) (0.914) (0.957) (0.899)
Observations 1,965,085 1,774,719 1,613,636 1,436,384
R-squared 0.311 0.305 0.304 0.301
Student Level Controls YES YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES YES
Region ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All standard
errors are clustered at school level and reported in parenthesis. This table only shows estimates
of interest. The data contains repeated cross-section information at students level during the
academic years 2007-2014. Outcome variables are yearly attendance rates of students in 9th grade,
10th grade, 11th grade and 12th grade, respectively. These variables are measured in percentage
points and goes from 0 to 100. Public is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the student
attends to a public school, 0 otherwise. 2011 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
the observation corresponds to year 2011, 0 otherwise. Student-level controls include a measure of
students’ ability unaﬀected by the strikes (the rank position of the students within their class 4
years before 12th grade, which is a continuous variable that goes between 0 and 100) and a gender
dummy. All regressions include school fixed eﬀects and time ⇥ region fixed eﬀects.
grades compared to students in voucher schools. This average reduction is very
similar across grades, with point estimates between 14.3 - 15.3 percentage points.
These results imply that on average diﬀerent cohorts of students in each of the
four grades of secondary education were exposed to the same large and negative
transitory shock to their attendance in 2011.
Next I study the eﬀect of the student strikes on public secondary school students’
academic outcomes, using the following reduced form regression:
Outcomeisrt = ↵s +  rt +
2010X
m=2007
 m(Y eart ⇥ Publics)+
2014X
n=2011
%n(Y eart ⇥ Publics) + x0irst'+ ✏isrt
(1.4)
This regression is a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimate of the eﬀect of the student
strikes on public secondary school students’ academic outcomes. In Equation (1.4)
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I also control for school fixed eﬀects, region ⇥ year fixed eﬀects, and the student-
level controls. The key assumption in a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences strategy is that the
evolution of outcomes in public and voucher schools would follow the same trend. If
the common trend assumption is not satisfied, it is expected that coeﬃcients  m are
statistically diﬀerent from zero. In addition, Equation (1.4) oﬀers a more flexible
estimation of the strikes’ impact on secondary school students’ outcomes. Indeed,
it decomposes the eﬀect, making it possible to study its evolution over time. These
yearly eﬀects are captured by coeﬃcients %n.
Figure 1.2 graphs the coeﬃcients of Equation (1.4) separately for each year and
appendix Table A.1 shows the regression results.20 At first glance, it is possible to
highlight two features: (i) In all outcomes, coeﬃcients  m are not statistically dif-
ferent from zero; and (ii) in math test and university enrollment, there is a negative
eﬀect of the student strikes on public school students that persists for the whole
post-strike period, even though students resumed classes as normal in 2012. This
second feature is interesting. It is reasonable to expect that the strikes could have
an immediate negative eﬀect on students’ performance, however, the impact lasts
well beyond 2011. Public school students who were in their penultimate year of sec-
ondary education at the time of the strikes were negatively aﬀected one year later,
when they sat their post-secondary high-stakes examinations in 2012. Similarly,
students who were in 10th and 9th grade in 2011 were negatively aﬀected in their
post-secondary exams, 2 and 3 years after the strikes.
In the high-stakes math exam, the eﬀect on the four cohorts of students that sat
the exams after the strikes is relatively constant and around 4.0%  . The immediate
impact of the strikes on university enrollment rates is 1.4 percentage points and
remains significant at the one percent level for the post-strike period. By contrast, I
do not find any significant eﬀect on the high-stakes language exam at the 5 percent
level. The eﬀect on the enrollment rate in selective universities has a similar pattern
to that on the high-stakes exams, because university enrollment depends on the
exam results.
A potential driver of the education outcomes after 2011 may have been that
20Appendix Figure A.6 presents in raw data the evolution of the three main academic outcomes
of interest in both types of schools. To make the comparison easier, levels in the year 2007 are set
to 0.
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Figure 1.2: Eﬀect of the student strikes on 12th grade public school students’ academic
outcomes
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Notes: Top panel plots parameter estimates of Equation (1.4), using the standardized score in
the high-stakes math exam of 12th grade students as a dependent variable. Middle panel plots
parameter estimates of Equation (1.4), using the standardized score in the high-stakes language
exam of 12th grade students as a dependent variable. Bottom panel plots parameter estimates of
Equation (1.4), using the enrollment status in a selective university of 12th grade students right
after finishing secondary school as a dependent variable. In the regressions, I use yearly repeated
cross-section data at student level during the academic years 2007-2014. I include school fixed
eﬀects and region ⇥ time fixed eﬀects. At student level, I control for pre-strikes measures of
individual students’ past performance. I also include a gender dummy.
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good students moved from public schools more aﬀected by the strikes to less aﬀected
voucher schools. I address this by assigning students who switched schools in 2012,
2013 and 2014 to their 2011 school. Appendix Figure A.7 shows the new results,
which are qualitatively the same as those in the main specification presented in
Figure 1.2. Point estimates barely change.
Another concern is that repetition rates increased in public schools in 2011 be-
cause of the sharp decline in attendance rates (top and middle panels in appendix
Figure A.8).21 Accordingly, the take-up rates of the high-stakes exams in public
schools went down in 2011 (bottom-left panel in appendix Figure A.8). As a re-
sult the 2010 and 2011 cohorts taking the high-stakes exam in public schools may
not be comparable, invalidating my diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimation strategy for
the high-stakes exam results in 2011. Moreover, this situation could have induced
self-selection of students across cohorts, which also threatens the identification of
my reduced form analysis. Self-selection might occur, for example, if low-achieving
students were more likely to repeat a grade due to school absenteeism in 2011 than
high-achieving students. I partly addressed this problem in my specification by con-
trolling for pre-strikes measures of students’ ability. Top-left and top-right panels of
appendix Figure A.9 provide the measure of students’ past performance over time
for non-repeaters and students that took the high-stakes exams, showing that the
strikes didn’t appear to aﬀect the trends of these measures. This first descriptive
evidence suggests that the strikes did not impact the composition of students’ ability
across cohorts. Furthermore, I conduct two robustness checks: (i) I put students
that repeated after 2011 back in their original cohorts; and (ii) I use an estimation
strategy inspired on Abadie (2003)22 to characterize the students that were induced
to repeat by the strikes in terms of their academic past performance. Appendix
Figure A.10 shows the results of the first exercise, which are qualitatively the same
as those obtained in the main specification presented in Figure 1.2. The result of
the second exercise is provided in Appendix ??. Equation (A.4) shows that the
mean ability of the students that repeated a grade induced by the strikes in 2011
21In Chile, students’ attendance rates can be a reason to repeat the academic year if the annual
attendance rate of a student is less than 85%; the school principal can consider individual cases.
22Abadie (2003) proposes an estimation method to describe compliers in instrumental variable
models.
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is similar to the mean ability of non-repeaters, allaying concern about self-selection
across cohorts in terms of students’ ability.
1.7 The Eﬀect of School Absenteeism on Academic
Outcomes
1.7.1 Aggregate School Absenteeism during Secondary School
I use the student strikes as an exogenous shock to estimate the eﬀect of school
absenteeism on secondary students’ academic outcomes. The high-stakes exams
cover the whole secondary education curriculum, so school attendance for all years
of secondary school could aﬀect exam results..
Table 1.3 has the results of the first-stage regressions in Columns 1 and 6, showing
a strong and significant eﬀect of the student strikes on absenteeism during secondary
school.23 This was expected from trends shown in appendix Figure A.5. Results
regarding academic outcomes are presented in Columns 2 to 5 , 7 and 8. Columns
2, 4 and 7 report the OLS results in math, language and enrollment in a selective
university. Columns 3, 5 and 8 contain the IV estimates. Three features stand
out: (i) OLS and IV point estimates show a negative eﬀect of absenteeism during
secondary school on all academic outcomes; (ii) OLS and IV estimates show a larger
eﬀect in math than in language; and (iii) OLS and IV point estimates are similar
in magnitude for the impact of absenteeism on math and university enrollment.
Columns 2 and 3 show the eﬀect of absenteeism on the high-stakes math exam. The
IV estimate suggests that a 10 percentage points24 decrease in school attendance rate
during secondary school is related to 9.5%   reduction in math exam score. Students’
performance in the high-stakes language exam is shown in Columns 4 and 5. The IV
23First-stage regression reported in Column 1 only contains 12th grade students that sat the high-
stake exams, while the first-stage regression reported in Column 6 includes the whole population
of 12th grade students.
24I express results in terms of a 10 percentage points decrease in attendance for two reasons: (i)
Because chronic absenteeism is defined as missing at least 10% of the school year for any reason;
and (ii) the average yearly absenteeism rate in 12th grade public school students in Chile is about
10%.
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point estimate suggests that a 10 percentage points decrease in the attendance rate
during secondary school reduces the language exam score by 2.9%  . Nevertheless,
this eﬀect is only significant at the 10 percent level. Finally, Columns 6 and 7 show
the estimates of the eﬀect on enrollment in selective universities. Again the IV
estimate is negative and highly significant, with a 10 percentage points decrease in
attendance rate during secondary school reducing the probability of enrolling in a
selective university by 3.2 percentage points.
It is informative to compare my results with previous findings in the literature.
My results show a larger eﬀect of school absenteeism on math scores than language
scores, which is a general finding in prior papers (Gottfried (2010), Goodman (2014),
Aucejo and Romano (2016)). In particular, my instrumental variable estimates are
very similar to the baseline results in Aucejo and Romano (2016). In this paper,
the authors estimate the eﬀect of absences and the length of the school calendar on
test score performance of primary public school students in North Carolina. Their
findings suggest that 10 days of primary school absence reduces math scores by 5.5%
 , and 2.9%   in reading, under their preferred specification. This implies that a 10
percentage points decrease in the yearly attendance (18 days) would reduce math
scores by 9.9%  .
Interestingly, previous research into other types of shocks to instructional time
has also found larger eﬀects on performance in math tests than in language tests
(teacher strikes (Baker (2013)), teacher absences (Herrmann and Rockoﬀ (2012)),
cross-country variation in instructional time (Lavy (2015)), among others). These
findings and my results suggest that the education production functions of math and
language are probably diﬀerent and that the role of the teacher and the classroom
learning process are more important for the former.
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Table 1.3: Eﬀect of secondary school absenteeism on academic outcomes
Math Language Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Absenteeism OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
public ⇥ 2011 4.041***
(0.232)
absenteeism in secondary (%) -0.00891*** -0.00952*** -0.00155*** -0.00293* -0.00371*** -0.00318***
(0.000338) (0.00157) (0.000287) (0.00158) (0.000141) (0.000578)
Observations 1,429,263 1,033,404 1,033,404 1,033,404 1,033,404 1,429,263 1,429,263
R-squared 0.385 0.478 0.478 0.431 0.431 0.250 0.250
Student Level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Region ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
F-test on instrument 303.2
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All standard errors are clustered at school level
and reported in parenthesis. This table only shows estimates of interest. The data contains repeated cross-section information at students
level during the academic years 2007-2014. Outcome variables are school absenteesim during secondary school education, the standardized
score in the high-stakes math exam, the standardized score in the high-stakes language exam and enrollment in a selective university,
respectively. Column 1 reports the first-stage estimates only considering the population of students that sat the high-stakes exams, while
column 6 reports the first-stage estimates considering the whole population of students. Columns 2, 4, and 7 report the OLS estimates
regarding the eﬀect of school absenteesim during secondary school education on academic outcomes, while columns 3, 5, and 8 reports the
IV estimates. School absenteesim during secondary school education is measured in percantage points, and therefore it is a continuous
variable that can take values from 0 to 100. High-stakes exams scores are standardized within each year. Enrollment is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the student was enrolled in a selective university right after finishing 12th grade. Public is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the student attends to a public school, 0 otherwise. 2011 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
observation corresponds to year 2011, 0 otherwise. Student-level controls include a measure of students’ ability unaﬀected by the strikes
(the rank position of the students within their class 4 years before 12th grade, which is a continuous variable that goes between 0 and
100) and a gender dummy. All regressions include school fixed eﬀects and time ⇥ region fixed eﬀects. In addition, for each student in
cohorts after 2011, I assign them the school (and therefore, also the region) she attended in 2011.
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Compared to other interventions, reducing absenteeism during secondary school
by 10 percentage points has a similar eﬀect in math to a 1  improvement in teacher
value added in the context of primary education (Rothstein (2010a), Chetty et al.
(2014b)). Nevertheless, in the context of first-year of post-secondary education (stu-
dents closer in age to my sample), my estimates are almost double (Scott E. Carrell
(2010), Braga et al. (2016)). In addition, reducing absenteeism during secondary
school by 10 percentage points has more than the double the eﬀect in math than of-
fering large financial incentives to secondary school teachers based on their students’
test performance (Lavy (2009)).
Heterogeneity
On average, absenteeism during secondary school has a negative impact on students’
academic outcomes. However, these eﬀects might diﬀer depending on students’
characteristics. I study heterogeneous responses to school absenteeism by dividing
the sample into students above, and students below, the median of the distribution
of past performance, which is the proxy for students’ ability.
The results are in Tables 1.4 and 1.5. Table 1.4 contains the results on the
high-stakes exams, with the results of the first-stage regressions in Columns 1 and
2 by students’ ability. Columns 3 to 6 show IV estimates of the eﬀect of school
absenteeism on the math and language exams by students’ ability. The IV point es-
timates for high-performing students are about double, indicating that public school
students in the upper part of the ability distribution are more aﬀected by school ab-
senteeism. Results in Columns (4) and (6) suggest that a 10 percentage points
decrease in the attendance rate of high-achieving students during secondary school
reduces their math exams score by 11.9%   and their language exam score by 4.3%
 . Both eﬀects are significant at the 1 percent level. Table 1.5 lays out the ef-
fect on university enrollment, showing the same pattern. The IV point estimate
in Column (4) suggests that a 10 percentage points decrease in attendance rate of
high-achieving students during secondary school reduces by 3.12 percentage points
their probability of enrolling in a selective university.25
25Appendix Figure A.11 presents academic outcomes divided by students’ ability, showing that
the larger impact on high-performing public school students is not driven by a specific year.
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Table 1.4: Eﬀect of secondary school absenteeism by students’ previous performance (High-stakes exams)
Absenteeism Math Language
Low-Achievers High-Achievers Low-Achievers High-Achievers Low-Achievers High-Achievers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV IV IV IV
public ⇥ 2011 3.741*** 4.617***
(0.236) (0.308)
absenteeism in secondary (%) -0.00653*** -0.0119*** -0.00215 -0.00430***
(0.00195) (0.00165) (0.00206) (0.00156)
Observations 462,753 570,622 462,753 570,622 462,753 570,622
R-squared 0.372 0.398 0.406 0.489 0.365 0.423
Student Level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Region ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
F-test on instrument 250.8 224.7
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All standard errors are clustered at school level and
reported in parenthesis. This table only shows estimates of interest. The data contains repeated cross-section information at students level
during the academic years 2007-2014. Outcome variables are school absenteesim during secondary school education, the standardized score
in the high-stakes math exam and the standardized score in the high-stakes language exam. Column 1 reports the first-stage estimates only
considering the population of low-achieving students that sat the high-stakes exams, while column 2 reports the first-stage estimates only
considering the population of high-achieving students that sat the high-stakes exams. Column 3 reports the IV estimates regarding the eﬀect
of school absenteesim during secondary school education on the high-stakes exams performance of low-achieving students, while columns 4
and 6 reports the IV estimates for high-achieving students. School absenteesim during secondary school education is measured in percantage
points, and therefore it is a continuous variable that can take values from 0 to 100. High-stakes exams scores are standardized within each
year. Public is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the student attends to a public school, 0 otherwise. 2011 is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the observation corresponds to year 2011, 0 otherwise. Student-level controls include a measure of students’
ability unaﬀected by the strikes (the rank position of the students within their class 4 years before 12th grade, which is a continuous variable
that goes between 0 and 100) and a gender dummy. All regressions include school fixed eﬀects and time ⇥ region fixed eﬀects. In addition,
for each student in cohorts after 2011, I assign them the school (and therefore, also the region) she attended in 2011.
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Table 1.5: Eﬀect of secondary school absenteeism by students’ previous performance (Enrollment)
Absenteeism Enrollment
Low-Achievers High-Achievers Low-Achievers High-Achievers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV IV
public ⇥ 2011 3.629*** 4.445***
(0.208) (0.279)
absenteeism in secondary (%) -0.00249*** -0.00412***
(0.000542) (0.000721)
Observations 710,450 718,795 710,450 718,795
R-squared 0.375 0.386 0.182 0.269
Student Level Controls YES YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES YES
Region ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES YES
F-test on instrument 303.4 254
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All standard errors are clustered at school level
and reported in parenthesis. This table only shows estimates of interest. The data contains repeated cross-section information at students
level during the academic years 2007-2014. Outcome variables are school absenteesim during secondary school education and enrollment
in a selective university. Column 1 reports the first-stage estimates considering the whole population of low-achieving students, while
column 2 reports the first-stage estimates considering the whole population of high-achieving students. Columns 3 reports the IV estimates
regarding the eﬀect of school absenteesim during secondary school education on the probability of enrollment in a selective university of
low-achieving students, while column 4 reports the IV estimates for high-achieving students. School absenteesim during secondary school
education is measured in percantage points, and therefore it is a continuous variable that can take values from 0 to 100. Enrollment is a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the student was enrolled in a selective university right after finishing 12th grade. Public is a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the student attends to a public school, 0 otherwise. 2011 is a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 if the observation corresponds to year 2011, 0 otherwise. Student-level controls include a measure of students’ ability unaﬀected
by the strikes (the rank position of the students within their class 4 years before 12th grade, which is a continuous variable that goes
between 0 and 100) and a gender dummy. All regressions include school fixed eﬀects and time ⇥ region fixed eﬀects. In addition, for each
student in cohorts after 2011, I assign them the school (and therefore, also the region) she attended in 2011.
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On average, public school students perform worse on the high-stakes exams, even
before the student strikes took place. Hence, my previous results imply that, within
the most deteriorated part of the school system, high-achieving students are the
most aﬀected by the school absenteeism. This evidence suggests a complementarity
between school attendance and the underlying ability in this group of students.
1.7.2 School Absenteeism in each Grade of Secondary School
A unique characteristic of my study is that I can estimate persistent eﬀects of school
absenteeism on students’ academic outcomes. The student strikes similarly aﬀected
the attendance rate of public school students in every secondary school grade during
2011. Nevertheless, students resumed classes as normal in 2012. This means that I
can study the eﬀect of absenteeism during each grade of secondary school on high-
stakes exams and enrollment in selective universities. To investigate the impact of
school absenteeism during 12th grade, I use Equations (1.1) and (1.2), only keeping
in my sample the pre-strike and 2011 cohorts of 12th grade students. The pre-strike
cohorts did not receive any shock to attendance in any grade during secondary
school, while the 2011 cohort was only aﬀected in 12th grade. Similarly, to study
the eﬀect of absenteeism during 11th grade, I only use the pre-strike and the 2012
cohorts of 12th grade students; to investigate the eﬀect of absenteeism during 10th
grade, I only use the pre-strike and the 2013 cohorts of 12th grade students, and to
study the eﬀect of absenteeism during 9th grade, I only use the pre-strike and the
2014 cohorts of 12th grade students. This is because the attendance rate of the 2012
cohort of 12th grade students was only aﬀected by the strikes when these students
were enrolled in 11th grade, the attendance rate of the 2013 cohort of 12th grade
students was only aﬀected when these students were enrolled in 10th grade, while
the attendance rate of the 2014 cohort of 12th grade students was only aﬀected when
these students were enrolled in 9th grade.
First-stage regressions are reported in appendix Tables A.2 and A.3, showing a
strong and significant eﬀect of the student strikes on absenteeism in each grade of
secondary school.26 Results of the OLS and IV estimations regarding the eﬀect of
26Point estimates in Table A.2 are slightly diﬀerent from those presented in Table 1.2 for three
reasons: (i) The low attendance rate of some students that repeated a grade in 2011 was replaced
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Figure 1.3: Eﬀect of school absenteeism in each secondary school’s grade on students
academic outcomes
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Notes: Top-left panel plots OLS and IV estimates regarding the eﬀect of school absenteeism during
each secondary school’s grade on the high-stakes math exam. Top-right panel plots OLS and
IV estimates regarding the eﬀect of school absenteeism during each grade of secondary school’s
grade on the high-stakes language exam. Bottom-left panel plots OLS and IV estimates regarding
the eﬀect of school absenteeism during each secondary’s school grade on enrollment in selective
universities. In the regressions, I use yearly repeated cross-section data at student level during the
academic years 2007-2010. For estimations regarding the eﬀect of school absenteeism in 9th grade,
10th grade, 11th grade and 12th grade, I also include the cohort of 12th grade students corresponding
to the academic year 2014, 2013, 2012 and 2011, respectively. The previous procedure is discussed
more in detail in Section 1.7.2. High-stakes exams scores are standarized within each year, and
enrollment in a selective university is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the student was
enrolled in a selective university right after finishing 12th grade. Attendance rate on each grade is
measured in percentage points and goes from 0 to 100. The instrument for school absenteeism is
(Publics⇥ 2011t), which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the student was attended
a public school in 2011, 0 otherwise. Student-level controls include a measure of students’ ability
unaﬀected by the strikes and a gender dummy. All regressions include school fixed eﬀects and time
⇥ region fixed eﬀects.
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school absenteeism of each grade on math, language and university enrollment are
reported in Figure 1.3 and appendix Tables A.4, A.5 and A.6. A first interesting
finding is the long-term implications of school absenteeism, reported in both OLS
and IV estimations: attendance during each grade of secondary school matters for
academic outcomes. A second interesting result is that OLS point estimates assign
more importance to the later grades in students’ academic performance, while IV
results suggest a more even eﬀect of each grade of secondary school. IV estimates
suggest that a 10 percentage points decrease in attendance rate in any grade during
secondary school reduces the math exam score by around 2.3 - 3.2%  . In addition,
IV regressions also suggest that the same decrease in attendance rate in any grade
during secondary school is related to a 0.8 - 1.2 percentage points decline in the
probability of enrolling in a selective university.
A potential driver of the persistent eﬀects on math and university enrollment
could be that public secondary school students were exposed to a large shock in
their school attendance during the strikes. This does not make my results less
interesting: Chronic absenteeism is more prevalent among teenagers, which implies
that a considerable fraction of secondary school students skip a large period of the
school year.
1.7.3 Robustness Checks
Using the student strikes as an instrumental variable to identify the eﬀect of school
absenteeism relies on the assumption that the student strikes only aﬀected secondary
school students’ academic outcomes through the eﬀect on attendance. Hence, fac-
tors changing at the same time as the student strikes that only aﬀect public school
students or voucher school students may be potential threats to the identification
strategy. Thinking on potential violations of the exclusion restriction and on key in-
puts to the education production function, in this section I discuss some mechanisms
that could be confounders of my results.
Transitory shocks during high-takes exams could have significant negative eﬀects
by their new attendance rate after passing that grade later; (ii) some students dropped out of
secondary school; and (iii) in the regressions reported in appendix Table A.2 I only use a sub-
group of cohorts of students.
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on students’ exams performance (Ebenstein et al. (2016)). In 2011, students sat the
high-stakes exams between the 11th and the 13th of December. Even though the
student strikes started to decay in October, a disruptive environment on the days of
the exams might aﬀect students’ academic outcomes. However, if this channel had
been the main driver we wouldn’t have observed an eﬀect in 2012, 2013 and 2014.
Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that disruption and misbehavior
in the classroom aﬀect students’ outcomes (Lazear (2001), Carrell and Hoekstra
(2010)). Therefore changes in the class and school environment due to the student
strikes might explain my findings. To explore this alternative, I use information
regarding school environment reported by teachers in the 8th grade SIMCE tests in
years 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2014. 8th grade is the last grade of primary education, so
I use information about schools that provide both primary and secondary education.
This is a non-random sample of secondary education schools. In fact, this set only
contains about 25% of the public schools and 56% of the voucher schools in the
whole sample. Appendix Figure A.12 lays out the students’ monthly attendance
rate in this sub-sample of schools for each grade of secondary education, showing
qualitatively the same pattern as the whole population. This suggests that the sub-
sample of schools was aﬀected by the student strikes in the same way as the whole
population. The information regarding school environment is reported by specific-
subject teachers (math, language, social science and natural science, which are the
subjects taken in the 8th grade SIMCE test), who often teach in both primary and
secondary education. In particular, I have information on: (i) How diﬃcult it is
to teach in the school due to student discipline; (ii) the degree to which rules are
respected by the students at the school; and (iii) the level of violence at the school.
Appendix Figure A.13 presents the results of the regression analysis. There are no
statistical diﬀerences across public and voucher schools in any outcome and point
estimates are close to zero. This suggests that changes in the school environment
are not driving the results relating to students’ academic performance.
Teachers are an essential input to the education production function (Rothstein
(2010a), Chetty et al. (2014b)). Thus, sorting of teachers across schools after the
student strikes is a potential mechanism through which the strikes might have af-
fected students’ performance. Good teachers from more aﬀected public schools may
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have moved to voucher schools less involved in the strikes. I study the turnover
of secondary school teachers across schools during the period using Equation (1.4)
and individual-level data of the complete population of teachers in the secondary
school system. In particular, I analyze the proportion of teachers that leave the
school during every year in the sample, as well as the proportion of teachers that
hold an academic degree, as a measure for capturing teacher quality. Results are
presented in appendix Figure A.14, showing that neither the turnover of teachers
across schools nor teachers’ qualifications seem to be aﬀected by the student strikes.
Student strikes might also have aﬀected teachers’ performance across schools by
making it more diﬃcult for public school teachers to cover the curriculum. This
implies that my results might not only be driven by the variation in school atten-
dance, but also by the impact on teachers’ eﬀectiveness in public schools. Appendix
Figure A.15 shows the correlation between past performance and the yearly school
attendance of public secondary school students separately by year. For all years in
the sample, the correlation is positive and very similar across years other than 2011.
Nevertheless, this correlation is still positive but much smaller in the school year
2011. This is evidence that it was not just low-performing students who participated
in the protests. Then I re-estimate Equation (1.4) separately for two groups of pub-
lic school students that took the high-stakes exams on years 2011 onwards: above
and below the median of their cohort school attendance in 2011. I keep all voucher
school students as a control group, and I use the diﬀerence in the performance be-
tween public and voucher school students in 2010 as a reference category. Appendix
Figure A.16 and A.17 shows the results. The eﬀects on the academic attainments
of the low-attendance students in 2011 are much larger in comparison to the results
provided in Figure 1.2, while there is no negative eﬀect in the high-attendance stu-
dents’ group. Even though students’ school attendance in 2011 is an endogenous
response to the strikes, this analysis allays the concern that public school students
who did attend classes during the protests (who are not necessarily high-achievers
in comparison to the ones protesting) were not taught the curriculum.
Finally, class size could have been aﬀected by the student strikes, for example
through a decrease in the eﬀective class size in 2011 due to high rates of absenteeism.
A second potential mechanism is a reduction in class size in public schools after
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2011 if the strikes accelerated the trend of students moving from public to voucher
schools.27 Therefore, the eﬀects I present might be attributable to a change in class
size rather than the strikes. Appendix Figure A.18 shows changes in class size in
each grade of secondary school education in public and voucher schools. Class size
in public schools started to fall before the strikes of 2011, and continued after that.
As the literature on class size suggests a positive eﬀect of smaller classes on student
achievement (Angrist and Lavy (1999), Krueger (2003), Fredriksson et al. (2012),
among others), this reduction in class size should go against my results. In addition,
and being aware of the potential bias induced by a bad control problem (Angrist and
Pischke (2008)), as an indicative exercise I re-estimate my main specification using
Equations (1.1) and (1.2), adding class size as a control. Results are presented in
appendix Table A.7: they remain almost unchanged in comparison to the results in
Table 1.3.
1.8 Concluding Remarks
I use the Chilean student strikes in 2011 to identify the eﬀect of absenteeism on sec-
ondary school students’ academic achievements. I show that student strikes, initially
led by university students but spreading to secondary school students, had a very
strong eﬀect on the attendance rate of public school students in 2011. The yearly
attendance rate of public school students in every grade of secondary education
dropped by around 15 percentage points, compared to students in voucher schools.
Nevertheless, the attendance rate of public secondary school students rebounded in
2012, when the protest action abated.
I use the exogenous variation in students’ school absenteeism to estimate its
eﬀects on students’ performance in post-secondary high-stakes exams and on their
university enrollment. I use the type of school that students attended in 2011 to
27During the last 25 years, there has been a considerable flow of students from public to voucher
schools. Since the introduction of the initial reform in 1980, students have moved from the public
system to voucher schools. In the early 90’s, 60% of the students were enrolled in public schools,
33% attended voucher schools and the remaining 7% attended private schools (Simonsen (2012)).
In 2012, only 39.7% of the students were enrolled in public schools, 53.1%. attended voucher
schools and the remaining 7.2% attended private schools.(MINEDUC (2015)).
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instrument students’ school absenteeism. Instrumental variables estimations suggest
that a 10 percentage points decrease in the attendance rate during secondary school
leads to a 9.5%   reduction in score in high-stakes math exams and a 3.2 percentage
point reduction in the probability of being enrolled in a selective university. In
contrast, I do not find any significant eﬀect on the high-stakes language exam at the
5 percent level.
A key finding is the persistent negative impact of school absenteeism on stu-
dents’ academic outcomes. This negative eﬀect is present even for those students
who had three years of regular schooling between the period of absenteeism and
sitting the high-stakes exam. This highlights the persistent consequences of school
absenteeism: attendance during each grade of secondary school matters in terms of
students’ academic performance. Instrumental variables estimates suggest that a
10 percentage points decrease in the attendance rate in any secondary school grade
leads to a reduction in the high-stakes math exam score between 2.3 - 3.2%  , while
the probability of enrolling in a selective university decreases by between 0.8 - 1.2
percentage points.
Robustness analysis shows that these findings are driven neither by the sorting
of students across schools following the strikes nor by the sorting of students across
cohorts induced by an increase in grade repetition rates in 2011. Moreover, factors
changing at the same time as the students strikes that only aﬀect public school
students or voucher school students may be potential threats to my identification
strategy. I provide evidence that the results are not driven by inputs to the education
production function that might have been aﬀected by the student strikes, such as
disruptiveness at the time of the high-stakes exams, school environment, teachers,
class instruction or class size.
From a policy perspective, understanding the eﬀect of school absenteeism on
secondary school students matters. Chronic absenteeism is more prevalent among
teenagers and a considerable fraction of secondary school students skip a large pro-
portion of the school year. School absenteeism could have short- and long-term im-
pacts on students’ academic achievements and merits attention from policy-makers.
Furthermore, reducing absenteeism could be a cost-eﬀective instrument for increas-
ing students’ instruction time, by making better use of the resources already allo-
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cated to schools such as classroom capacity, teacher allocation and timetabling.
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Figures
Figure A.1: Public support for Government’s education policy
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Notes: This information is captured in a monthly survey by GfK - Adimark, one of the largest
Chilean firms dedicated to collect public perceptions.
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Figure A.2: Average monthly attendance rates in grades 9th to 11th
Students Strikes Period
45
55
65
75
85
95
M
ea
n A
tte
nd
an
ce
 ( 
%
 )
m
ar
_1
1
m
ay
_1
1
jul
_1
1
se
p_
11
no
v_
11
m
ar
_1
2
m
ay
_1
2
jul
_1
2
se
p_
12
no
v_
12
m
ar
_1
3
m
ay
_1
3
jul
_1
3
se
p_
13
no
v_
13
m
ar
_1
4
m
ay
_1
4
jul
_1
4
se
p_
14
no
v_
14
m
ar
_1
5
voucher public
11th Grade
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Notes: Top panel plots the average monthly attendance rates in 11th grade during the academic
years 2011-2014. Middle panel plots the average monthly attendance rates in 10th grade during
the academic years 2011-2014. Bottom panel plots the average monthly attendance rates in 9th
grade during the academic years 2011-2014.
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Figure A.3: Distribution of School Attendance in Secondary School Education
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Notes: Top-left panel plots the school attedance’s distribution of pubic secondary school students
during the academic years 2007-2014. Top-right panel plots the school attedance’s distribution of
pubic and voucher secondary school students in the academic year 2011. Bottom-left panel plots
the mean school attedance’s distribution of pubic secondary school students at school level during
the academic years 2007-2014. Bottom-right panel plots the mean school attedance’s distribution
of pubic and voucher secondary school students at school level in the academic year 2011.
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Figure A.4: Average yearly attendance rates in grades 9th to 12th
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Notes: Top panel plots the average yearly attendance rates in 11th grade during the academic
years 2007-2014. Middle panel plots the average yearly attendance rates in 10th grade during the
academic years 2007-2014. Bottom panel plots the average yearly attendance rates in 9th grade
during the academic years 2007-2014.
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Figure A.5: Secondary school attendance rates of 12th grade students
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Notes: The figure plots the average attendance rate during the whole secondary school of 12th
grade students over the academic years 2007-2014.
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Figure A.6: Academic outcomes of 12th grade students
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Notes: Top panel plots the average standardized score in the high-stakes math exam during the
academic years 2007-2014. Middle panel plots the average standardized score in the high-stakes
language exam during the academic years 2007-2014. Bottom panel plots the average enrollment
rates in selective universities during the academic years 2007-2014. In order to facilitate the
interpretation, levels in year 2007 are set to 0.
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Figure A.7: Eﬀect of the student strikes on 12th grade public school students’ academic
outcomes (Intention to Treat (ITT))
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Notes: Top panel plots parameter estimates of Equation (1.4), using the standardized score in
the high-stakes math exam of 12th grade students as a dependent variable. Middle panel plots
parameter estimates of Equation (1.4), using the standardized score in the high-stakes language
exam of 12th grade students as a dependent variable. Bottom panel plots parameter estimates of
Equation (1.4), using the enrollment status in a selective university of 12th grade students right
after finishing secondary school as a dependent variable. In the regressions, I use yearly repeated
cross-section data at student level during the academic years 2007-2014. I include school fixed
eﬀects and region ⇥ time fixed eﬀects. At student level, I control for pre-strikes measures of
individual students’ past performance. I also include a gender dummy. In addition, I assign to
students who switched schools in 2012, 2013 and 2014; their 2011 school.
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Figure A.8: Repetition rates in grades 9th to 12th and high-stakes exams take-up rates
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Notes: Top-left panel plots the average repetition rates in 12th grade during the academic years
2007-2014. Top-right panel plots the average repetition rates in 11th grade during the academic
years 2007-2014. Middle-left panel shows the average repetition rates in 10th grade during the
academic years 2007-2014. Middle-right panel shows the average repetition rates in 9th grade
during the academic years 2007-2014. Bottom plots the average high-stakes exams’ take-up rates
during the academic years 2007-2014.
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Figure A.9: Past performance of 12th grade students and repetition rates
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Notes: Top-left panel plots the average past performance of 12th grade non-repeater students
during the academic years 2007-2014, while the top-right panel plots the average past performance
of 12th grade non-repeater students that took the high-stakes exams in the same period. Bottom-
left panel plots the average repetition rates in 12th grade during the academic years 2007-2014.
Bottom-right panel compares the past performance of 12th grade students that repeated grade and
those students that did not repeat grade during the academic years 2007-2014.
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Figure A.10: Eﬀect of the student strikes on 12th grade public school students’ academic
outcomes (placing post-strikes repeaters back to their original cohorts)
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Notes: Top panel plots parameter estimates of Equation (1.4), using the standardized score in
the high-stakes math exam of 12th grade students as a dependent variable. Middle panel plots
parameter estimates of Equation (1.4), using the standardized score in the high-stakes language
exam of 12th grade students as a dependent variable. Bottom panel plots parameter estimates
of Equation (1.4), using the enrollment status in a selective university of 12th grade students
right after finishing secondary school as a dependent variable. In the regressions, I use yearly
repeated cross-section data at student level during the academic years 2007-2014. I include school
fixed eﬀects and region ⇥ time fixed eﬀects. At student level, I control for pre-strikes measures
of individual students’ past performance. I also include a gender dummy. In addition, I place
post-strikes repeaters back to their original cohorts.
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Figure A.11: Yearly attendance rates and academic outcomes of 12th grade students by
students’ past performance
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Notes: Top-left panel plots the average monthly attendance rates in 12th grade during the academic
years 2007-2014. Top-right panel plots the average standardized score in the high-stakes math exam
during the academic years 2007-2014. Bottom-left panel shows the average standardized score in
the high-stakes language exam during the academic years 2007-2014. Bottom-right panel shows
the average enrollment rates in selective universities during the academic years 2007-2014. In order
to facilitate the interpretation, levels in year 2007 are set to 0.
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Figure A.12: Monthly attendance rates in grades 9th to 12th among the schools that oﬀer
both primary and secondary education and took the 8th grade SIMCE test in 2011
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Notes: Top-left panel plots the average monthly attendance rates in 12th grade during the academic
years 2011-2014 among the schools that oﬀer both primary and secondary education and took the
8th grade SIMCE test in 2011. Top-right panel plots the average monthly attendance rates in
11th grade during the academic years 2011-2014 among the schools that oﬀer both primary and
secondary education and took the 8th grade SIMCE test in 2011. Bottom-left panel shows the
average monthly attendance rates in 10th grade during the academic years 2011-2014 among the
schools that oﬀer both primary and secondary education and took the 8th grade SIMCE test in
2011. Bottom-right panel shows the average monthly attendance rates in 9th grade during the
academic years 2011-2014 among the schools that oﬀer both primary and secondary education and
took the 8th grade SIMCE test in 2011.
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Figure A.13: Eﬀect of the student strikes on school environment
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Notes: Top panel plots parameter estimates of Equation (1.4), using as a dependent variable the
standardized score regarding the diﬃculty to teach in the school due to students’ indiscipline
behavior. Middle panel plots parameter estimates of Equation (1.4), using as a dependent variable
the standardized score regarding the degree on which the rules in the school are respected by
the students. Bottom panel plots parameter estimates of Equation (1.4), using as a dependent
variable the standardized score regarding the degree of violence at the school. In the regressions, I
use teacher-level data for years 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2014. I include school fixed eﬀects and region
⇥ time fixed eﬀects. At teacher level, I control for dummy variables regarding the subject taught
by each teacher. I also include a gender dummy. All outcome variables are questions answered by
the teachers regarding diﬀerent situations at school level and these outcomes are standarized at
year level.
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Figure A.14: Eﬀect of the student strikes on secondary school teachers
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Notes: Top panel plots parameter estimates of Equation (1.4), using as a dependent variable an
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the teacher leaves the school. Middle panel plots
parameter estimates of Equation (1.4), using as a dependent variable an indicator variable that
takes the value of 1 if the teacher holds a degree. Bottom panel plots parameter estimates of
Equation (1.4), using as a dependent variable an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the
teacher holds a degree and a specialization. In the regressions, I use yearly data at teacher level
during the academic years 2007-2014. I include school fixed eﬀects and region ⇥ time fixed eﬀects.
At techer level, I control for teachers’ age and a gender dummy.
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Figure A.15: Correlation between yearly school attendance and past performance of
public secondary school students
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Notes: The figure plots the correlation between public secondary school students’ past performance
and their yearly attendance rate over the academic years 2007-2014.
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Figure A.16: Eﬀect of the student strikes on 12th grade public school students’ academic
outcomes (public school students below median of the yearly attendance in 2011)
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Notes: Top panel plots parameter estimates of Equation (1.4), using the standardized score in
the high-stakes math exam of 12th grade students as a dependent variable. Middle panel plots
parameter estimates of Equation (1.4), using the standardized score in the high-stakes language
exam of 12th grade students as a dependent variable. Bottom panel plots parameter estimates of
Equation (1.4), using the enrollment status in a selective university of 12th grade students right
after finishing secondary school as a dependent variable. In the regressions, I use yearly repeated
cross-section data at student level during the academic years 2007-2014. For the academic year
2010, I keep in my sample all 12th grade students in public and voucher schools. For the academic
years 2011 onwards, I keep in my sample all 12th grade students in voucher schools and 12th grade
students in public schools whose yearly attendance in 2011 was below the median of public school
students’ attendance distribution in their cohort that year. I include school fixed eﬀects and region
⇥ time fixed eﬀects. At student level, I control for pre-strikes measures of individual students’
past performance. I also include a gender dummy. In addition, I place post-strikes repeaters back
to their original cohorts.
50
Figure A.17: Eﬀect of the student strikes on 12th grade public school students’ academic
outcomes (public school students above median of the yearly attendance in 2011)
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Notes: Top panel plots parameter estimates of Equation (1.4), using the standardized score in
the high-stakes math exam of 12th grade students as a dependent variable. Middle panel plots
parameter estimates of Equation (1.4), using the standardized score in the high-stakes language
exam of 12th grade students as a dependent variable. Bottom panel plots parameter estimates of
Equation (1.4), using the enrollment status in a selective university of 12th grade students right
after finishing secondary school as a dependent variable. In the regressions, I use yearly repeated
cross-section data at student level during the academic years 2007-2014. For the academic year
2010, I keep in my sample all 12th grade students in public and voucher schools. For the academic
years 2011 onwards, I keep in my sample all 12th grade students in voucher schools and 12th grade
students in public schools whose yearly attendance in 2011 was above the median of public school
students’ attendance distribution in their cohort that year. I include school fixed eﬀects and region
⇥ time fixed eﬀects. At student level, I control for pre-strikes measures of individual students’
past performance. I also include a gender dummy. In addition, I place post-strikes repeaters back
to their original cohorts.
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Figure A.18: Class size in grades 9th to 12th
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Notes: Top-left panel plots the average class size in 12th grade during the academic years 2007-2014.
Top-right panel plots the average class size in 11th grade during the academic years 2007-2014.
Bottom-left panel shows the average class size in 10th grade during the academic years 2007-2014.
Bottom-right panel plots the average class size in 9th grade during the academic years 2007-2014.
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Tables
Table A.1: Yearly eﬀect of the student strikes on students’ academic outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
Math Language Enrollment
public ⇥ 2007 0.00381 0.00657 -0.00624**
(0.00952) (0.00913) (0.00275)
public ⇥ 2008 -0.00550 0.0142* 0.00175
(0.00860) (0.00820) (0.00264)
public ⇥ 2009 0.00342 -0.0155* 0.00211
(0.00765) (0.00794) (0.00246)
public ⇥ 2011 -0.0333*** -0.0152* -0.0144***
(0.00809) (0.00837) (0.00297)
public ⇥ 2012 -0.0414*** -0.00744 -0.0156***
(0.00831) (0.00878) (0.00319)
public ⇥ 2013 -0.0404*** -0.000298 -0.0127***
(0.00897) (0.00943) (0.00352)
public ⇥ 2014 -0.0328*** 0.00652 -0.00945**
(0.0114) (0.0112) (0.00391)
Observations 1,033,409 1,033,409 1,429,263
R-squared 0.475 0.430 0.248
Student Level Controls YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES
Region ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All
standard errors are clustered at school level and reported in parenthesis. This table only shows
estimates of interest. The data contains repeated cross-section information at students level during
the academic years 2007-2014. Outcome variables are the standardized score in the high-stakes
math exam, the standardized score in th high-stakes language exam and enrollment in a selective
university, respectively. High-stakes exams scores are standardized within each year and enrollment
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the student was enrolled in a selective university
right after finishing 12th grade. Public is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the student
attends to a public school, 0 otherwise. Year dummy variables are intercated with Public and they
take the value of 1 if the observation corresponds to that specific year, 0 otherwise. Student-level
controls include a measure of students’ ability unaﬀected by the strikes (the rank position of the
students within their class 4 years before 12th grade, which is a continuous variable that goes
between 0 and 100) and a gender dummy. All regressions include school fixed eﬀects and time ⇥
region fixed eﬀects. Public ⇥ 2010 is used as base category.
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Table A.2: First-stage regressions for each grade of secondary school (whole cohort of
students)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Abs_9th Abs_10th Abs_11th Abs_12th
public ⇥ 2011 12.46*** 12.55*** 13.27*** 14.85***
(0.789) (0.770) (0.849) (0.903)
Observations 908,511 910,836 914,123 922,582
R-squared 0.356 0.363 0.390 0.399
Student Level Controls YES YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES YES
Region ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES YES
F-test instrument 249.6 266 244.1 270.1
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All standard
errors are clustered at school level and reported in parenthesis. This table only shows estimates of
interest. The data contains repeated cross-section information at students level of the whole cohort
of students during the academic years 2007-2010. For estimations regarding 9th grade, 10th grade,
11th grade and 12th grade, I also include the whole cohort of 12th grade students corresponding
to the academic year 2014, 2013, 2012 and 2011, respectively. The previous procedure is discussed
more in detail in Section 1.7.2. Outcome variables are school absenteesim in 9th grade, 10th grade,
11th grade and 12th grade, respectively. Public is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
student attends to a public school, 0 otherwise. 2011 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1
if the observation corresponds to year 2011, 0 otherwise. Student-level controls include a measure
of students’ ability unaﬀected by the strikes (the rank position of the students within their class 4
years before 12th grade, which is a continuous variable that goes between 0 and 100) and a gender
dummy. All regressions include school fixed eﬀects and time ⇥ region fixed eﬀects.
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Table A.3: First-stage regressions for each grade of secondary school (only students that
sat the high-stakes exams)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome: Yearly attendance rate 9th Grade 10th Grade 11th Grade 12th Grade
public ⇥ 2011 14.08*** 14.03*** 14.88*** 14.91***
(0.949) (0.936) (1.029) (1.098)
Observations 654,737 650,149 649,956 646,906
R-squared 0.372 0.372 0.401 0.401
Student Level Controls YES YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES YES
Region ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES YES
F-test instrument 220.3 224.5 209 184.3
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All
standard errors are clustered at school level and reported in parenthesis. This table only shows
estimates of interest. The data contains repeated cross-section information at students level of
the students that sat the high-stakes exams during the academic years 2007-2010. For estimations
regarding 9th grade, 10th grade, 11th grade and 12th grade, I also include the cohort of 12th grade
students that sat the high-stakes exams corresponding to the academic year 2014, 2013, 2012 and
2011, respectively. The previous procedure is discussed more in detail in Section 1.7.2. Outcome
variables are school absenteesim in 9th grade, 10th grade, 11th grade and 12th grade, respectively.
Public is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the student attends to a public school, 0
otherwise. 2011 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the observation corresponds to
year 2011, 0 otherwise. Student-level controls include a measure of students’ ability unaﬀected by
the strikes (the rank position of the students within their class 4 years before 12th grade, which is
a continuous variable that goes between 0 and 100) and a gender dummy. All regressions include
school fixed eﬀects and time ⇥ region fixed eﬀects.
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Table A.4: Eﬀect of school absenteeism in each secondary school’s grade on math
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
absenteeism in 9th (%) -0.00208*** -0.00325***
(0.000211) (0.000702)
absenteeism in 10th (%) -0.00326*** -0.00277***
(0.000197) (0.000610)
absenteeism in 11th (%) -0.00383*** -0.00284***
(0.000204) (0.000551)
absenteeism in 12th (%) -0.00414*** -0.00234***
(0.000190) (0.000496)
Observations 654,737 654,737 650,149 650,149 649,956 649,956 646,906 646,906
R-squared 0.474 0.474 0.484 0.484 0.483 0.483 0.486 0.485
Student Level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Region ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All standard errors are clustered at school level and
reported in parenthesis. This table only shows estimates of interest. The data contains repeated cross-section information at students level
during the academic years 2007-2010. For estimations regarding 9th grade, 10th grade, 11th grade and 12th grade, I also include the cohort
of 12th grade students corresponding to the academic year 2014, 2013, 2012 and 2011, respectively. The previous procedure is discussed
more in detail in Section 1.7.2. Outcome variable is the standardized score in the high-stakes math exam. High-stakes math exam’s score is
standardized within each year. Attendance rate on each grade is measured in percentage points and goes from 0 to 100. The instrument for
school absenteeism is (Publics ⇥ 2011t), which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the student was attended a public school in
2011, 0 otherwise. Odd columns report the OLS estimates for 9th grade, 10th grade, 11th grade and 12th grade, respectively. Even columns
report their counterpart IV estimates. Student-level controls include a measure of students’ ability unaﬀected by the strikes (the rank position
of the students within their class 4 years before 12th grade, which is a continuous variable that goes between 0 and 100) and a gender dummy.
All regressions include school fixed eﬀects and time ⇥ region fixed eﬀects.
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Table A.5: Eﬀect of school absenteeism in each secondary school’s grade on language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
absenteeism in 9th (%) 0.000187 -0.00121*
(0.000212) (0.000662)
absenteeism in 10th (%) -0.000792*** -0.000213
(0.000199) (0.000642)
absenteeism in 11th (%) -0.00119*** -0.000684
(0.000172) (0.000574)
absenteeism in 12th (%) -0.00159*** -0.00121**
(0.000165) (0.000513)
Observations 654,737 654,737 650,149 650,149 649,956 649,956 646,906 646,906
R-squared 0.435 0.435 0.436 0.436 0.441 0.441 0.443 0.443
Student Level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Region ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All standard errors are clustered at school level
and reported in parenthesis. This table only shows estimates of interest. The data contains repeated cross-section information at students
level during the academic years 2007-2010. For estimations regarding 9th grade, 10th grade, 11th grade and 12th grade, I also include
the cohort of 12th grade students corresponding to the academic year 2014, 2013, 2012 and 2011, respectively. The previous procedure
is discussed more in detail in Section 1.7.2. Outcome variable is the standardized score in the high-stakes language exam. High-stakes
language exam’s score is standardized within each year. Attendance rate on each grade is measured in percentage points and goes from
0 to 100. The instrument for school absenteeism is (Publics ⇥ 2011t), which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the student
was attended a public school in 2011, 0 otherwise. Odd columns report the OLS estimates for 9th grade, 10th grade, 11th grade and 12th
grade, respectively. Even columns report their counterpart IV estimates. Student-level controls include a measure of students’ ability
unaﬀected by the strikes (the rank position of the students within their class 4 years before 12th grade, which is a continuous variable
that goes between 0 and 100) and a gender dummy. All regressions include school fixed eﬀects and time ⇥ region fixed eﬀects.
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Table A.6: Eﬀect of school absenteeism in each secondary school’s grade on university enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
absenteeism in 9th (%) -0.000809*** -0.000845***
(0.000070) (0.000302)
absenteeism in 10th (%) -0.00137*** -0.000964***
(0.000082) (0.000262)
absenteeism in 11th (%) -0.00151*** -0.00124***
(0.000085) (0.000242)
absenteeism in 12th (%) -0.00169*** -0.00106***
(0.000078) (0.000168)
Observations 908,511 908,511 910,836 910,836 914,123 914,123 922,582 922,582
R-squared 0.250 0.250 0.251 0.251 0.254 0.254 0.253 0.253
Student Level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Region ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All standard errors are clustered at school level and
reported in parenthesis. This table only shows estimates of interest. The data contains repeated cross-section information at students level
during the academic years 2007-2010. For estimations regarding 9th grade, 10th grade, 11th grade and 12th grade, I also include the cohort of
12th grade students corresponding to the academic year 2014, 2013, 2012 and 2011, respectively. The previous procedure is discussed more in
detail in Section 1.7.2. Outcome variable is enrollment in a selective university, which is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the
student was enrolled in a selective university right after finishing 12th grade. Attendance rate on each grade is measured in percentage points
and goes from 0 to 100. The instrument for school absenteeism is (Publics ⇥ 2011t), which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
the student was attended a public school in 2011, 0 otherwise. Odd columns report the OLS estimates for 9th grade, 10th grade, 11th grade
and 12th grade, respectively. Even columns report their counterpart IV estimates. Student-level controls include a measure of students’ ability
unaﬀected by the strikes (the rank position of the students within their class 4 years before 12th grade, which is a continuous variable that
goes between 0 and 100) and a gender dummy. All regressions include school fixed eﬀects and time ⇥ region fixed eﬀects.
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Table A.7: Eﬀect of secondary school absenteeism on academic outcomes (controlling for class size)
Math Language Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Absenteeism OLS IV OLS IV Absenteeism OLS IV
public ⇥ 2011 4.184*** 3.998***
(0.266) (0.231)
absenteeism in secondary (%) -0.00873*** -0.00835*** -0.00136*** -0.00170 -0.00367*** -0.00293***
(0.000337) (0.00160) (0.000283) (0.00161) (0.000141) (0.000583)
Observations 1,033,404 1,033,404 1,033,404 1,033,404 1,033,404 1,429,263 1,429,263 1,429,263
R-squared 0.390 0.478 0.478 0.432 0.432 0.386 0.250 0.250
Student Level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Region ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
F-test on instrument 248.1 298.7
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All standard errors are clustered at school level and reported
in parenthesis. This table only shows estimates of interest. The data contains repeated cross-section information at students level during the
academic years 2007-2014. Outcome variables are school absenteesim during secondary school education, the standardized score in the high-stakes
math exam, the standardized score in the high-stakes language exam and enrollment in a selective university, respectively. Column 1 reports the
first-stage estimates only considering the population of students that sat the high-stakes exams, while column 6 reports the first-stage estimates
considering the whole population of students. Columns 2, 4, and 7 report the OLS estimates regarding the eﬀect of school absenteesim during
secondary school education on academic outcomes, while columns 3, 5, and 8 reports the IV estimates. School absenteesim during secondary school
education is measured in percantage points, and therefore it is a continuous variable that can take values from 0 to 100. High-stakes exams scores
are standardized within each year. Enrollment is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the student was enrolled in a selective university
right after finishing 12th grade. Public is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the student attends to a public school, 0 otherwise. 2011
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the observation corresponds to year 2011, 0 otherwise. Al class-level, I control for class size.
Student-level controls include a measure of students’ ability unaﬀected by the strikes (the rank position of the students within their class 4 years
before 12th grade, which is a continuous variable that goes between 0 and 100) and a gender dummy. All regressions include school fixed eﬀects
and time ⇥ region fixed eﬀects. In addition, for each student in cohorts after 2011, I assign them the school (and therefore, also the region) she
attended in 2011.
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Characterizing students that were induced to repeat
by the student strikes
Let me define:
Ai as the measure of student i past performance.
Yi as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if student i is observed in
year 2011.
Ii as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if student i was induced to
repeat by the student strikes.
Ri as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if student i repeated the
grade.
Si as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if student i attended a public
school.
By conditional expectations:
E [Ai |Ri = 1, Yi = 1, Si = 1]| {z }
mean students’ past performance
of repeaters in 2011
= E [Ai | Ii = 0, Ri = 1, Yi = 1, Si = 1]| {z }
mean students’ past performance
of always repeaters in 2011
⇥
Pr(Ii = 0 |Ri = 1, Yi = 1, Si = 1)| {z }
proportion of always
repeaters in 2011
+
E [Ai | Ii = 1, Ri = 1, Yi = 1, Si = 1]| {z }
mean students’ past performance
of induced repeaters in 2011
⇥
Pr(Ii = 1 |Ri = 1, Yi = 1, Si = 1)| {z }
proportion of induced
repeaters in 2011
(A.1)
Where,
Pr(Ii = 1 |Ri = 1, Yi = 1, Si = 1) = 1  Pr(Ii = 0 |Ri = 1, Yi = 1, Si = 1) (A.2)
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By conditional probability:
Pr(Ii = 0 |Ri = 1, Yi = 1, Si = 1) = Pr(Ii = 0 \ Ri = 1 |Yi = 1, Si = 1)
Pr(Ri = 1 |Yi = 1, Si = 1) (A.3)
Consider the following assumptions:
A1. Timing of the strikes
Strikes only aﬀected the behaviour of public school students in 2011:
Pr(Ii = 1 |Yi = 0, Si = 1) = E [Ii |Yi = 0, Si = 1] = 0
A2. Proportion of repeaters
The proportion of always repeaters in public schools is stable over time:
Pr(Ii = 0 \ Ri = 1 |Yi = 1, Si = 1) ⇡
Pr(Ri = 1 |Yi = 0, Si = 1) = E [Ri |Yi = 0, Si = 1]
A3. Past performance of repeaters
The mean past performance of always repeaters in public schools is stable over time:
E [Ai | Ii = 0, Ri = 1, Yi = 1, Si = 1] ⇡ E [Ai |Ri = 1, Yi = 0, Si = 1]
Assumption 1 comes from the fact that the student strikes only took place during
2011. Assumptions 2 and 3 are based on the trends presented in the top-left and
the bottom-left panel of figure A.9.
From the data,
E [Ai |Ri = 1, Yi = 0, Si = 1] = 41.01
E [Ri |Yi = 0, Si = 1] = 0.0263
Pr(Ri = 1 |Yi = 1, Si = 1) = E [Ri |Yi = 1, Si = 1] = 0.0719
E [Ai |Ri = 1, Yi = 1, Si = 1] = 49.9
E [Ai |Ri = 0, Yi = 1, Si = 1] = 58.84
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Combining Equations (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3), using assumptions 1, 2 and 3, and
the data; implies that for students in public schools:
41.01| {z }
mean students’
past performance
of always
repeaters in 2011
⇥ 0.0263
0.0719| {z }
proportion
of always
repeaters
in 2011
+ y|{z}
mean students’
past performance
of induced
repeaters in 2011
⇥ (0.0719  0.0263)
0.0719| {z }
proportion
of induced
repeaters
in 2011
⇡ 49.9|{z}
mean students’
past performance
of repeaters
in 2011
=) y ⇡ 55.03 ⇡ 55.84| {z }
mean students’
past performance
of non-repeaters
in 2011
(A.4)
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Chapter 2
Estimating Value-Added Models for
Doctoral Teaching Assistants:
Evidence from a Random
Assignment Procedure at a UK
University
2.1 Introduction
The value-added (VA) approach is the most prominent method for evaluating teacher
quality. This is based on measuring teacher impacts on students’ test scores. Re-
search using VA models indicates that teacher quality is an important determinant
of student achievement in primary and secondary education (Rockoﬀ (2004), Rivkin
et al. (2005), Aaronson et al. (2007), Kane and Staiger (2008), Chetty et al. (2014b)).
Evidence for how the quality of instruction aﬀects students’ academic outcomes is
rarer at the post-secondary level. This is because exams are not standardized, and
students generally choose their course work and their teachers, leading to an endoge-
nous match that can impose a significant bias in teachers’ value-added estimates
(Rothstein (2010b)). Moreover – even under random assignment – VA estimates
can be eroded if teachers “teach to the test” or favor their students by simplifying
the assessments or the content of the course, or by inflating academic tests scores
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(Carrell and West (2010), Chetty et al. (2014b)).
This chapter focuses on the Economics Department of a UK university where, for
each core module, undergraduate (UG) students are randomly allocated to seminar
classes taught by diﬀerent doctoral teaching assistants (DTAs). Doctoral teaching
assistants are widely-employed in the post-secondary sector and they perform vari-
ous duties that can impact UG students’ success in the course (Lusher et al. (2015)):
they host weekly discussion classes, solving questions, exercises, and problem sets.
DTA-student relationships are more like a peer-to-peer interaction, since the age gap
between undergraduates and DTAs is usually small.1 Furthermore, with student-
professor ratios increasing, DTA’s influence on students’ academic achievement is
likely to grow over time (Cuseo (2007), Kokkelenberg et al. (2008), Schanzenbach
(2014)). Beside their intrinsic policy relevance, we argue that DTAs are an in-
formative group to study. DTAs do not decide what is taught, write exams or
systematically mark their students’ scripts. Arguably, these features allow estima-
tion of value-added models that are less likely to confound “teaching quality” with
unrelated factors (Carrell and West (2010), Chetty et al. (2014b)).
Our dataset includes UG students’ demographics, courses and classes attended,
timing of the class, and identifiers of the DTA assigned to each class. An exclusive
feature of the data is to provide marks for separate types of evaluation of the course
taught by the DTA. In particular, we have marks for: (i) assessments carried out
during the term, which have a low weight in the total mark; (ii) tests taken at the
end of each term that carry a slightly higher weight; (iii) end of year exams, which
account for about 80% of the total mark. There is usually a non-teaching break
before the final exams that allows students to revise the material covered during the
entire course.
The empirical approach is validated by tests confirming the reliability of the ran-
dom allocation of UG students to classes. The value-added estimates show that a
one standard deviation change in DTA quality increases students’ scores by around
8.5 percent of a standard deviation ( ). This result is robust to the inclusion of type
1Several studies have focused on the potential benefits of peer-based mentoring and tutoring.
For example, Castleman and Page (2015) find that near-aged peer mentors in college who sent text
messages during the summer to college-intending high school graduates substantially increased
college enrollment.
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of evaluation fixed eﬀects, students’ characteristics, class characteristics, peer char-
acteristics, and a set of fixed eﬀects for the date/time of the class. The magnitude of
the estimates is similar to other VA studies in post-secondary education exploiting
random assignment of students to classes (Carrell and West (2010), Braga et al.
(2016)).
The granularity of the data allows for a novel estimation of the within-course
VA dynamics. This reveals a startling decay: Estimates are larger for assessments
taken during the course (16%  ), drop for end-of-term tests (6%  ), and are not
statistically diﬀerent from zero for final exams, implying that there is no variation
in DTA eﬀectiveness for the final exams. These results are thoroughly examined:
robustness checks confirm that the lack of persistence of the VA estimates is genuine,
and it is not driven by changes in the sample composition, nor by outliers.
While previous research in post-secondary education has detected long-term
teacher-eﬀects for subsequent courses (taught by a diﬀerent teacher) and even in
the labor market (Braga et al. (2016)), in this chapter we find a sharp VA decay
through the academic year for separate evaluations of the same course taught by
the same teacher. In general, the (lack of) persistence of the teacher eﬀects could
reflect two main mechanisms (Jacob et al. (2010)): (i) Students may engage in po-
tentially endogenous subsequent investments, which either mitigate or exacerbate
the consequences of the allocation to a particular teacher; (ii) students may forget
information or lose skills that they acquired from a particular teacher. The under-
lying mechanisms suggest that the decay might be related to students’ endogenous
investments. For example, students could compensate for being assigned to a low-
value-added DTA by working harder in the non-directed study period before the
final exam. This increase in eﬀort might be amplified by the high weight of the final
exam in the course final mark. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out that the lack of
variation in DTAs eﬀectiveness detected in final exams is consistent with students
rapidly losing skills that they acquired when interacting with a DTA.
This chapter contributes to the literature estimating VAmodels in post-secondary
education. Two studies have exploited the random assignment of students to teach-
ers. Carrell and West (2010) examine students at the U.S. Air Force Academy. They
find that a one standard deviation change in professor quality increases students’
65
scores by around 0.05 . Instructors that were better at improving contemporary per-
formance received higher teacher evaluations but were less successful at promoting
“deep-learning”, as indicated by student performance in subsequent courses. Braga
et al. (2016) estimate teacher eﬀects at Bocconi University. They find significant
variation in teacher eﬀectiveness, roughly 0.04  both for academic and labor market
outcomes. The professors who were best at improving the academic achievement of
their best students were also the ones who boosted their earnings the most. Focus-
ing on large, introductory courses at a Canadian research university, Hoﬀmann and
Oreopoulos (2009) find the standard deviation of professor eﬀectiveness measured
by course marks is no larger than 0.08 . Other recent studies have concluded that
instructors play a larger role in student success. Bettinger et al. (2014) examine
instructor eﬀectiveness using data from DeVry University, a large for-profit insti-
tution in which the average student takes two-thirds of her courses online. They
find that being taught by an instructor that is 1  more eﬀective improves student
course marks by about 0.18  to 0.24 . Among instructors of economics, statistics
and computer science at an elite French public university, Brodaty and Gurgand
(2016) find that a 1  increase in teacher quality is associated with a 0.14  to 0.25 
increase in student test results. De Vlieger et al. (2017) focus on the University of
Phoenix, a large for-profit university that oﬀers both online and in person courses
in a wide array of fields and degree programs. A 1  increase in instructor quality
is associated with 0.3  increase in marks in current course and a 0.2  increase in
marks in the subsequent course in the math sequence.
Our study also adds on the literature on teaching assistants in post-secondary
education. Few related papers study how the origin and ethnicity of graduate teach-
ing assistants (TAs) aﬀect student performance. Lusher et al. (2015) examine the
role of graduate TAs’ ethnicity and find that students’ marks increase when they are
assigned to same-ethnicity graduate TAs. Borjas (2000) finds that foreign-born TAs
negatively aﬀect student marks. Fleisher et al. (2002) find that foreign-born gradu-
ate TAs have negligible eﬀects on student marks which, in some circumstances, can
even be positive. Bettinger et al. (2016) look at the eﬀect of having a PhD student
as a full instructor on students’ subsequent major choices. They find that students
are more likely to major in a subject if the first courses in that subject are taught
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by a PhD student. Feld et al. (2017) study the eﬀect of being assigned to a bachelor
or a masters student as an instructor. Student instructors are almost as eﬀective as
senior instructors at improving academic achievement and labor market outcomes.
This chapter unfolds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the institutional back-
ground and the data. Section 2.3 introduces the empirical design and presents four
tests on the random assignment procedure of students to classes performed by the
University administration. Section 2.4 presents the results, robustness checks, and
heterogeneity analysis. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background
The analysis focuses on undergraduate students enrolled in a highly ranked Eco-
nomics Department of a UK University.2 Students’ acceptance to the program is
based on a minimum of A*AA in the A-level examination, with a compulsory math-
ematics component. Admission is highly competitive: only 9% of the students that
sat A-level exams in England during the academic year 2011/2012 met this thresh-
old.3 The undergraduate program is 3 years with a mix of core and optional courses.
Core courses might diﬀer across the 5 main bands of the program.4Each academic
year has three ten-week terms. Students generally take five courses. In the first two
terms there are one or two lectures per week, taught by faculty members.5
PhD students in Economics are typically employed as teaching assistants.6 They
2This Department is regularly among the top five UK Economics Departments in diﬀerent
rankings, including QS World University Ranking, Shangai University Ranking, IDEAS/RePEc
Ranking, Times Higher Education Ranking, among others.
3International students who studied outside the UK need to score 38 points in the International
Baccalaureate, including 6 points in Higher Level Mathematics. This appears to be an equally
selective threshold. More information on the international baccalaureate can be found here.
4The 5 main bands of the undergraduate program are Economics; Economics and Industrial
Organization; Economics and Economic History; Philosophy, Politics and Economics and Mathe-
matics and Economics.
5 For a small minority of courses, there are also lectures in the third term.
6 Selection for PhD students in the Department of Economics involves screening by an ad-
hoc committee. Prospective doctoral students submit a personal statement, academic transcripts,
English certificate, GRE and two academic references. While there is no published threshold for
doctoral candidates, on average each year the Department receives 230 applications and accepts
15-20 students. This puts the acceptance rate below 9%.
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teach weekly seminars for small groups of undergraduate students. Attendance is
mandatory and the seminars go for one hour. Within each course, DTAs follow the
same syllabus and use identical academic material including questions, exercises,
and problem sets. DTAs do not choose the academic material, nor do they prepare
assessments, tests, or final exams. The course leader, who is faculty, designs the
course, prepares teaching material and writes assessments. PhD students do mark
scripts. However, two features reduce the concerns that DTAs might systematically
inflate their students’ marks. First, assessments and end-of-term tests are randomly
allocated among all the DTAs teaching the course and final exams are randomly
allocated among PhD students in the Department of Economics, who are not nec-
essarily DTAs. This means that DTAs do not systematically mark their students’
scripts. Second, university regulation requires that all oﬃcial scripts (assessments,
end-of-term tests, final exams) be anonymous. The sole mode of recognition is a
7-digit identifier.
2.2.1 Data
The sample includes data from the 2008/09 to the 2011/12 academic year. We focus
on 8 core courses: Macroeconomics 1, Microeconomics 1, Economics 1, The World
Economy (1st year courses); Macroeconomics 2, Microeconomics 2, Economics 2,
and Econometrics (2nd year courses). These courses allow an unbiased estimation
of the DTAs value-added measures because students in these courses are randomly
allocated to seminars, and they employ multiple doctoral students as teaching assis-
tants. The randomness of the allocation procedure will be tested in Section 2.3.1.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the sample. There are 2,189 students:
40.1% are female; 44% come from overseas; 81.7% are enrolled in the Economics
Department. The sample includes 66 DTAs’ identifiers. For confidentiality reasons,
no other information is available for doctoral teaching assistants. On average, each
course employs 4 DTAs, has 2 assessments, 1 test and 1 final exam.7 We have
24,914 evaluations measuring students’ academic achievement against a set of course-
7All courses have a final exam. Macroeconomics I and Microeconomics II do not have mid-term
assessments. The following 4 courses have end-of-term tests: Macroeconomics I, Microeconomics
I, Microeconomics II, and Econometrics.
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specific predetermined learning outcomes: 11,859 assessments; 6,542 end-of-term
tests and 6,513 final exams. The mark scale goes from 0 to 100.8 The data also
provide information on the weight of each evaluation in the final mark of the course.
The sample includes 589 classes, with an average size of nearly 14 students. Close to
half of the classes are taught in the morning; 35.3% are on Mondays, while classes
on Wednesdays account for 10.5% of the seminars. Finally, we have information on
average students’ evaluations of the DTA for each course taught. On a scale of 1 to
5, the average DTAs’s score is 4 (where 1 is poor and 5 is excellent).
2.3 Empirical Design
The empirical strategy is set to examine the variation in student academic perfor-
mance across DTAs teaching diﬀerent classes in the same course, in a given year.
The value-added model is defined as follows:
yeskdcy =  e +  cy + x
0
kdcy ⇥  1 + z0skdcy ⇥  2 + ↵d + ✏eskdcy (2.1)
The outcome variable yaikjct is the mark in the evaluation e obtained by the
student s of class k in course c taught by the DTA d during the academic year y.
We standardize the mark (within type of evaluation/course/year) to have a mean of
zero and a standard deviation of one. Course ⇥ Year fixed eﬀects ( cy) account for
course/year specific shocks that are common across classes but independent across
DTAs. The vector zskdcy corresponds to a set of student-level controls, including a
gender dummy, a dummy variable regarding student’s overseas status, and a dummy
variable indicating the enrollment in the Department of Economics. Class-level
controls are contained in the vector xkdcy. This includes class size, a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the class was taught in the morning, and a set of dummy
variables for the day of the week on which the class was taught. This vector also
includes the share of peers in the class that are: (i) Female, (ii) with overseas
status, and (iii) enrolled in the Department of Economics. Evaluations fixed eﬀects
8Figure B.1 in the appendix shows the distribution of marks by type of evaluation, also reporting
mean and standard deviation.
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( e) control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across diﬀerent types of
evaluations. Robust standard errors are clustered at the DTA level; ✏eskdcy is the
student-specific stochastic error term.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Total Mean Standard Deviation
Course level:
Number of courses 8
Number of courses / year 32
Number of DTAs 4.06 1.76
Number of classes 18.41 3.02
Number of students 207.78 60.96
Number of assessments 2.06 1.83
Number of midterms 0.91 1.00
Number of exams 1.00 0.00
Doctoral Teaching Assistant (DTA) level:
Number of DTAs 66
Number of courses 1.97 1.14
Number of classes 8.92 6.31
Number of assessments 179.68 154.33
Number of midterms 99.12 113.69
Number of exams 98.68 70.77
Students evaluation 4.00 0.49
Class level:
Number of classes 589
Class size 13.91 4.81
Morning (%) 53.48
Monday (%) 35.31
Tuesday (%) 15.96
Wednesday (%) 10.53
Thursday (%) 21.56
Friday (%) 16.64
Student level: 2,189
Female (%) 40.11
Overseas (%) 44.04
Enrolled in econ. Dept. (%) 81.73
Evaluation level:
Number of assessments 11,859
Number of tests 6,542
Number of exams 6,513
Weight of assessments (%) 6.05 4.21
Weight of tests (%) 8.64 1.64
Weight of exams (%) 80.23 12.84
Notes: The sample includes the following courses: Macroeconomics 1, Microeco-
nomics 1, Economics 1, The World Economy, Macroeconomics 2, Microeconomics
2, Economics 2 and, Econometrics (from 2008/09 to 2011/12).
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The term ↵d represents the unobserved heterogeneity among the DTAs. This
quantifies the individual contribution of each DTA to students’ academic achieve-
ments. The within-course variance of this individual contribution is the main pa-
rameter of interest, and we call this the value-added estimate. Following Rockoﬀ
(2004), Carrell and West (2010), and De Vlieger et al. (2017), Equation (2.1) is
estimated as a random intercept model. The following assumptions are imposed:
1. ↵d are independent and identically distributed: ↵d ⇠ N (0,  2↵);
2. ✏eskdcy are independent and identically distributed: ✏eskdcy ⇠ N (0,  2✏ );
3. ↵d and ✏eskdcy are independent of each other.
The deterministic component of the model ( e +  cy + x
0
kdcy ⇥  1 + z0skdcy ⇥  2)
is estimated by feasible Generalized Least Squared (GLS), considering the structure
placed in the variance of both ↵d and ✏eskdcy. Subsequently,  2↵ and  2✏ are estimated
by maximum likelihood. We use an Empirical Bayes (EB) procedure, also known as
the Bayesian shrinkage estimator, to predict the random parameters ↵d.9
2.3.1 Testing the Random Assignment
In a typical value-added estimation, sorting of students to teachers is a major threat
to the identification of a causal parameter. High-achieving students might choose
the best DTAs, leading to VA estimates that are upward biased. In the current
setting, classes are randomly sorted using an algorithm.10 This section tests the
reliability of the random assignment of students to classes, which is necessary to
validate the subsequent empirical analysis.11
9The Bayesian shrinkage estimates are a best linear unbiased predictor of each DTA’s random
component, which takes into account the variance (signal to noise) and the number of observations
for each DTA. Specifically, estimates with a higher variance and a smaller number of observations
are shrunk toward zero (Carrell and West (2010)).
10The university used the Myeconomics platform, which generates a stratified random assignment
algorithm (using individual characteristics such as gender, and course of provenience) to place
students into classes of equal size within each course/year.
11In principle, students are unable to change either classes or tutors. Students are reallocation in
certain circumstances, with the permission of the undergraduate oﬃce. In our dataset, 7% of the
students were observed in multiple classes within the same course. Nearly 40% of these “multiple
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Testing the Random Allocation: Students’ Achievement
Due to the scope of this study, we are particularly interested in testing the (lack
of) selection associated with students’ ability. The data provided by the University
do not contain information about students’ academic achievement prior to enroll-
ment in the undergraduate program. We conduct two randomness tests on students
attending 2nd year courses for whom we can observe 1st year marks. This applies
to four core modules (Macroeconomics II, Microeconomics II, Economics II and,
Econometrics) for three academic years (2009/10 to 2011/12).
Table 2.2: Testing the random allocation of students to classes (a VA approach)
(1) (2) (3)
DTA value-added 0.00003670 0.00000003 0.00005283
( 0.00150350) (0.00000124) (0.00194919)
Observations 2,325 2,325 2,325
Number of DTAs 32 32 32
Number of classes 217 217 217
Course ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES
Class-level controls NO YES YES
Student-level controls NO NO YES
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Stan-
dard errors reported in parenthesis are clustered at the DTA level. We focus on students
attending 2nd year courses, for which we can also observe 1st year marks. This is the case
in 4 core modules (Macroeconomics II, Microeconomics II, Economics II, and Econometrics)
for three academic years (2009/10 to 2011/12). The dependent variable is the weighted av-
erage of all the final marks earned by the student in the 1st year of the program. Class-level
controls include: class size; dummy variables for the day/time of the week; shares of peers in
the class that are female, with an overseas status, and who were enrolled in the Department
of Economics. Student-level controls include dummies for: gender, overseas status, and en-
rolment in the Department of Economics. Column 1 includes Course ⇥ Year FE. Column 2
adds class-level controls. Column 3 adds student-level controls. The procedure to obtain the
“value-added” estimate and related-confidence interval is explained in section 2.3.
observations” were in a diﬀerent class taught by the same tutor. It is not possible to distinguish the
class assigned to the student and the class attended by the student in the data. For this reason, we
exclude from the sample students who are not exclusively assigned to a class. However, we conduct
robustness checks including these students in the sample and results are practically unchanged.
This is discussed in detail in Section 2.4.
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The first test estimates Equation (2.1). The dependent variable is the weighted
average of all the final marks earned by the student in the 1st year of the program.
Final marks are a weighted average of all evaluations in each course. Under random
assignment of students to classes, we expect DTAs to teach to a pool of 2nd year
students who have a similar distribution of ability. Therefore DTAs’ value-added
measures for 2nd year courses, estimated using 1st year marks, should not be sta-
tistically diﬀerent from zero. The results are in Table 2.2, providing first empirical
evidence in support of the random allocation hypothesis.12
The second test follows Carrell and West (2010). We test the random placement
of students to classes using resampling techniques. For each class, we randomly draw
(without replacement) 10,000 classes of equal size from the population of students
attending the same course. For each simulated class, we calculate the average mark
of the students in the 1st year. We then compute p-values for each class, representing
the fraction of simulated classes with the average mark smaller than the real one.
Under random assignment, any p-value is equally likely to be observed, and therefore
the expected distribution of the empirical p-values should be uniform. We test the
uniformity of these distributions using the Kolomogorov-Smirnov test and a  2 test.
The results are in Table 2.3. We reject the null hypothesis of uniform distribution
for 1 of 12 course/year tests at the 5% level using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. We
never reject the null hypothesis in 12 tests using the  2 test at the 5% level. These
tests confirm the reliability of the random allocation procedure.
Testing the Random Allocation: Students’ Covariates
We perform two supplementary tests on all the sample. Results are in appendix
Tables B.1 and B.2. The first test is similar to Equation (2.1), but employs student-
specific time invariant characteristics as an outcome. These are: (i) Gender, (ii)
overseas status, and (iii) enrollment in the Department of Economics. The results
are in appendix Table B.1. As we should expect, DTAs value-added measures are
not statistically diﬀerent from zero, indicating that no significant diﬀerences exist in
these dimensions across groups of students enrolled in the same course, but allocated
12We did the same analysis using the mark earned by the students in the final exams of each
course as a dependent variable. Results are qualitatively unchanged, and are available upon request.
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Table 2.3: Testing the random allocation of students to classes (KS test and  2 test)
Empirical p-values Kolmogorov-Smirnov test  2 test
Mean SD (N failed / total tests) (N failed / total tests)
Macroeconomics II 0.501 0.275 0/3 0/3
Microeconomics II 0.497 0.290 1/3 0/3
Economics II 0.480 0.276 0/3 0/3
Econometrics 0.496 0.306 0/3 0/3
Notes: the test focuses on students attending 2nd year courses, for which 1st year marks are also
available. This is the case in 4 core modules (Macroeconomics II, Microeconomics II, Economics
II and, Econometrics) for three academic years (2009/10 to 2011/12). For each class, we randomly
draw (without replacement) 10,000 classes of equal size from the population of students attending
the same course. For each simulated class, we calculate the average mark of the students in the 1st
year. We then compute p-values for each class, representing the fraction of simulated classes with
the average mark smaller than the real one. We report the number of Kolmogorov-Smirnov and
 2 tests for the uniformity of the distribution of p-values (that should be expected under random
assignment of students to classes) failing at the 5% significance level.
to diﬀerent DTAs.
The second test follows Braga et al. (2016). Using the three sets of students’ char-
acteristics as a dependent variable (gender, overseas status, and enrollment in the
Department of Economics) we run separate Probit regressions for each course/year,
including class-specific dummies. The null hypothesis is that the coeﬃcients on the
class dummies in each model are jointly equal to zero, which amounts to testing for
the equality of the means of the observables, across classes within the same course.
Appendix Table B.2 contains the results. We have 32 tests for each student charac-
teristic, as we focus on eight courses in four years. At the 5% significance level, we
never reject the null hypothesis for gender, we reject four times the null hypothesis
for overseas status, and we reject twice the null hypothesis regarding being enrolled
in the Economics Department. While we believe that the outcome of this test is very
satisfactory, the estimation of the value-added model will be shown to be robust to
the inclusion of individual and peer-level controls.13
13DTAs are also randomly allocated to seminar classes. This is to prevent any perception of
unfairness in the teaching schedule for doctoral students. The random allocation of DTAs to classes
allays any concern that value-added estimates might be contaminated by confounding factors. For
instance, we might be worried that a DTA teaches at the preferred day and time of the week. We
do not have personal information about DTAs, which constrains our ability to test the reliability
of the random assignment of DTAs to seminar classes. However, the empirical estimation of the
value-added model will be shown to be stable to the inclusion of indicators on the date/time of
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2.4 Results
DTAs’ value-added estimates obtained using Equation (2.1) are presented in Ta-
ble 2.4. Column 1 shows the baseline regression, where Course ⇥ Year fixed eﬀects
are included. The resulting standard deviation in DTA quality, as measured by the
value-added model, is around 0.085. This estimate is significant at the 1% level.
Columns (2) to (4) test the robustness of the estimate to the inclusion of type of
evaluation fixed eﬀects, class-level controls, peer controls, and individual-level con-
trols. Estimates are stable and precise across specifications, and always below the
1% significance level.14 A 1  change in DTA quality increases students’ test scores
by about 8.5%  .15
Table 2.5 employs a unique feature of our dataset: information on marks for
diﬀerent evaluations - assessment, end-of-term test, and final exam. We exploit
within-course variation across type of evaluations to search for heterogeneity in
DTAs’ value-added estimates. Arguably, at least two dimensions of variation might
matter in this context: (i) Diﬀerent evaluations carry a diﬀerent weight in the final
mark; and (ii) these evaluations occur at diﬀerent times, while the DTA is teaching,
and after the teaching component of the course has finished. Assessments taken
during term time have the lowest weight in the final mark, with a mean of 6% (see
Table 2.1). Tests are written examinations that take place right at the end of each
term and carry a slightly higher weight (average of 8.6%). Exams occur at the end
of the academic year usually after a long study break, and typically account for 80%
of the final mark.
Table 2.5 presents DTAs’ value-added estimates by type of evaluation obtained
using Equation (2.1). DTAs have a large impact on assessments: a one standard
deviation change in DTA quality increases students’ test scores by around 0.16 of a
standard deviation. VA estimates drop by around 65% for end-of-term tests, to 0.06
the class.
14Appendix Table B.3 tests the sensitivity of the precision of the main results to the change in
the level of clustering. We report results unclustered, and clustered at the tutor and class level.
The inference is practically unchanged.
15Appendix Table B.4 provides the DTAs’ value-added estimates obtained using Equation (2.1),
including in the sample students that are observed in more than one class within the same course
(as described in Footnote 11). Results are practically unchanged.
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Table 2.4: DTAs “value-added” model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DTA value-added 0.0858*** 0.0858*** 0.0841*** 0.0866***
(0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0240) (0.0260)
Observations 24,914 24,914 24,914 24,914
Number of DTAs 66 66 66 66
Number of classes 589 589 589 589
Course ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES YES
Evaluation FE NO YES YES YES
Class-level controls NO NO YES YES
Student-level controls NO NO NO YES
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard
errors reported in parenthesis are clustered at the DTA level. The sample includes Macroeconomics
1, Microeconomics 1, Economics 1, The World Economy, Macroeconomics 2, Microeconomics 2,
Economics 2, and Econometrics (from 2008/09 to 2011/12 included). Marks are standardised
within type of evaluation/course/year to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
Class-level controls include class size, dummy variables for the day/time of the week, shares of peers
in the class that were female, with an overseas status, and who were enrolled in the Department of
Economics. Student-level controls include dummies for: gender, overseas status, and enrolment in
the Department of Economics. Column 1 includes Course ⇥ Year FE. Column 2 adds evaluation
fixed-eﬀects. Column 3 adds class-level controls. Column 4 adds student-level controls. The
procedure to obtain the “value-added” estimate and related-confidence interval is explained in
Section 2.3.
of a standard deviation. The estimates for both assessment and end-of-term tests are
significant at the 1% level. Finally, the DTAs’ value-added estimates are very close
to zero for final exams, implying that there is no variation in DTAs eﬀectiveness in
the final exams.16
Robustness Checks
The number of DTAs and the number of classes vary across columns in Table 2.5.
While this is intrinsic to the set-up, we test the robustness of the findings focusing
on a sample of courses that involve assessments, tests, and exams. This is the case
for Microeconomics I and Econometrics. That is, each column will now show value-
added estimates obtained on the same sample of courses, classes and tutors. Results
are in appendix Table B.5. The value-added measure for assessment is now around
16The table shows a VA estimate and a related standard error of zero. These approximate
2.48⇥ 10 8 for the value-added, and 7.67⇥ 10 7 for the standard errors.
76
Table 2.5: DTAs “value-added” model by type of evaluation
(1) (2) (3)
Assessment Test Exam
DTA value-added 0.164*** 0.0603** 0
(0.0454) (0.0268) (0)
Observations 11,859 6,542 6,513
Number of DTAs 56 41 66
Number of classes 442 317 591
Course ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES
Class-level controls YES YES YES
Student-level controls YES YES YES
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard
errors reported in parenthesis are clustered at the DTA level. The sample includes Macroeconomics
1, Microeconomics 1, Economics 1, The World Economy, Macroeconomics 2, Microeconomics 2,
Economics 2, and Econometrics (from 2008/09 to 2011/12 included). Marks are standardised
within type of evaluation/course/year to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
Class-level controls include class size, dummy variables for the day/time of the week, shares of peers
in the class that were female, with an overseas status, and who were enrolled in the Department of
Economics. Student-level controls include dummies for: gender, overseas status, and enrolment in
the Department of Economics. Column 1 reports “value-added” estimates for assessment, column
2 for end-of-term tests, column 3 for final exams. The procedure to obtain the “value-added”
estimate and related-confidence interval is explained in Section 2.3.
0.10 of a standard deviation, significant at the 1% level.17 Estimates for tests and
exams are practically unchanged, suggesting that the decay in the estimates is not
driven by a systematic change in the composition of the sample.
The estimates for assessments are around 0.16 of a standard deviation: this
magnitude is larger than that for tests and exams. We test the robustness of this
result, running separate regressions (only using assessments as an outcome) that
exclude one academic course at a time. Results are in appendix Table B.6. We
observe remarkably stable estimates and confidence intervals in each column of the
table, indicating that the larger results for assessment are unlikely to be driven by
outliers.
We also investigate whether our results are driven by diﬀerences in students’ type
across the diﬀerent bands oﬀered in the undergraduate program. We test the robust-
17The sample size is significantly reduced in this exercise. In the baseline regression of Table 2.5
we have 11,859 observations to estimate the value-added for assessment. In this table we use 6,148
observations.
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ness of our results focusing only on the students enrolled in the Economics band,
which is the largest one. Results are provided in appendix Table B.7. Column 1 re-
ports value-added estimates using the pooled sample of evaluations, while columns
2 to 4 lay out the value-added estimates separately by type of evaluation. Point
estimates barely change and results remain qualitatively unchanged in comparison
to those reported in Tables 2.4 and 2.5.
Discussion
The decay in the estimates is a key finding. While previous research in post-
secondary education has detected long-term teacher-eﬀects for subsequent courses
taught by a diﬀerent teacher, and even in the labor market (Braga et al. (2016)),
we are unaware of other studies detecting a sharp VA decay for subsequent eval-
uations of the same course, taught by the same tutor. We hypothesize that this
decay could be connected to two non-exclusive forces (Jacob et al. (2010)): (i) Stu-
dents may forget information or lose skills that they acquired under a particular
teacher; (ii) students may make endogenous investments (that might be amplified
by the importance of the evaluation) that could mitigate the consequences of the
assignment to a particular teacher.18 In particular, students could compensate for
being assigned to a low-value-added DTA by exerting more eﬀort to prepare for the
final exam. Classes are only in the 1st and 2nd term and the final exam is in 3rd
term after a long period of self-guided study, which includes a month without no
teaching. Moreover, this is a top UK Economics Department with high-achieving
undergraduate students who may be well equipped to compensate for variance in
DTA performance during the period of self-preparation.
These two aspects are closely connected and therefore diﬃcult to disaggregate.
However, the next section extends the empirical analysis to detect further infor-
mative heterogeneity of the VA estimates, while shedding light on the channels
contributing to their decay.
It is important to highlight that our estimates are informative about potential
18End-of-term tests and final exams are always performed individually, within the university.
Assessments instead are a more mixed type of evaluation. They could involve individual or group
assessments taken at home or in class (such as individual or group presentations, for example).
The data do not allow for a further inspection of the various types of assessments.
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variation in DTAs’ eﬀectiveness. Nevertheless, our estimates do not provide informa-
tion in term of levels (i.e., could be that all DTAs provide a substantial contribution
on their students’ academic performance, but there is no diﬀerence on this individ-
ual contribution across DTAs). Thus, policy implications of our results could diﬀer
depending on the goal. For example, if the Department wants heterogeneity on
DTA’s individual contributions to their students’ performance in the intermediate
assessments but not in the final exam (which carries the highest weight), our results
deliver this outcome.
2.4.1 Heterogeneity in the Estimates and Other Results
This section examines DTAs’ value-added estimates by students’ year of study. Then
it focuses on two student characteristics: overseas status and gender. Finally, it
investigates the correlation between DTA quality and students’ evaluation of the
DTA.
Students’ Year of Study
Students in UK universities must obtain 40 points out of 100 in each of the 1st year
courses to proceed to 2nd year. Courses in the 1st year do not contribute to students’
grade at the end of the undergraduate program, which is a weighted average of 2nd
and 3rd year marks.19 This could be an informative source of variation. If the lack
of persistence in the VA estimate is connected with students’ endogenous responses
to an increase in the weight of the evaluation, we would expect to observe a drop in
the value-added estimates in the 2nd year of study, when students are likely to exert
more eﬀort.
Results by students’ year of study are shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.6.
DTAs’ value-added estimates are 0.12  for courses taken in the 1st year of study
and 0.03  for courses taken in the 2nd year of study. The estimate for 1st year
courses is significant at the 1% level, while the estimate for 2nd year courses is not
statistically diﬀerent from zero. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that
when the evaluations are more important students exert more eﬀort, reducing the
19Courses in the 3rd year are not in the sample, as these are optional modules and do not have
a DTA.
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contribution of the DTA to the outcome. However, 2nd year students might be more
mature, experienced, and willing to work more (independently of the importance of
the exam). Overall, both these dynamics (weight of the test and maturity of the
student) could reduce the extent to which DTAs aﬀect students’ academic success.
The composition of the evaluations in 1st and 2nd year courses is rather diﬀerent.20
This might aﬀect the interpretation of the above estimates. That is, the drop in the
VA measures in the 2nd year might be driven by the change in composition of the
evaluations in the sample of analysis, rather than by a change in students’ personal
investments, such as an increase in eﬀort. We investigate this by estimating the two
separate samples (years 1 and 2) by type of evaluation. Figure 2.1 reports estimates
and 95% confidence intervals obtained using Equation (2.1). The estimates for
assessment are around 0.2  in the 1st year, and 0.1  in the 2nd year. A similar decay
in the estimates (steeper in 1st year course) is observed across types of evaluation.
To conclude, these exercises show that VA estimates are larger for 1st year courses
and for assessments (both in years 1 and 2). The findings appear to be consistent
with the hypothesis that students work harder on assessments that carry a higher
weight, potentially mitigating the consequences of the assignment to a particular
teacher. This would reduce the VA coeﬃcient.
Students’ Demographics
Students’ demographics represent another interesting source of variation. We have
information about gender and overseas status for all the students in the sample.
One might posit that female students would exert more eﬀort, since male high-
school students are overwhelmingly less likely than female high-school students to
spend time doing homework or other study set by teachers (OECD (2015)). Overseas
students might exert more eﬀort because they pay higher fees at UK universities.21
20In the sample of 1st year courses, we have 5,691 assessments, 2,185 tests and 3,040 exams.
These account for 52%, 20% and 28% respectively of the evaluations in 1st year courses. In the
sample of 2nd year courses, we have 6,168 assessments, 4,357 tests and 3,473 exams. These account
for 44%, 31% and 25% of the 2nd year course evaluations.
21UK and EU students pay about £9,200 per year. Overseas students pay about £17,460 per
year. See here.
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Table 2.6: DTAs “value-added” model (further heterogeneity)
Year of the Program Gender Overseas Status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1st year course 2nd year course Female Male Overseas Home/EU
DTA value-added 0.126*** 0.0280 0.0881*** 0.0746*** 0.0973** 0.123***
(0.0316) (0.0174) (0.0295) (0.0199) (0.0463) (0.0191)
Observations 10,916 13,998 9,616 15,298 10,587 14,327
Number of DTAs 31 43 66 66 66 66
Number of classes 289 300 572 588 582 582
Course ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Evaluation FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Class-level controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Student-level controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard errors reported in parenthesis
are clustered at the DTA level. The sample includes Macroeconomics 1, Microeconomics 1, Economics 1, The World Economy,
Macroeconomics 2, Microeconomics 2, Economics 2, and Econometrics (from 2008/09 to 2011/12). Marks are standardised
within type of evaluation/course/year to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Class-level controls include
class size, dummy variables for the day/time of the week, shares of peers in the class that were female, with an overseas
status, and who were enrolled in the Department of Economics. Student-level controls include dummies for: gender, overseas
status, and enrolment in the Department of Economics. Columns 1 and 2 report the results for 1st year and 2nd year courses,
respectively. Columns 3 and 4 show the results for female and male, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 report the results for
overseas and home/EU students, respectively. The procedure to obtain the “value-added” estimate and related-confidence
interval is explained in Section 2.3.
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Figure 2.1: DTA “value-added” by type of evaluation and year of the undergraduate
program
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Notes: The table shows DTA “value-added” by type of evaluation and year of the undergraduate
program. Standard errors are clustered at the DTA level. The sample includes Macroeconomics
1, Microeconomics 1, Economics 1, The World Economy, Macroeconomics 2, Microeconomics 2,
Economics 2, and Econometrics (from 2008/09 to 2011/12). Marks are standardised within type
of evaluation/course/year to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Class-level
controls include class size, dummy variables for the day/time of the week, shares of peers in the
class that were female, with an overseas status, and who were enrolled in the Department of
Economics. Student-level controls include dummies for: gender, overseas status, and enrolment in
the Department of Economics. The procedure to obtain the “value-added” estimate and related-
confidence interval is explained in Section 2.3.
We estimate a VA model for these two samples. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.6
show the results by gender. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.6 show the results by overseas
status. Results are quite balanced by students’ gender: we detect a value-added
estimate for males of 0.07 , and for females of 0.09 . Both estimates are significant
at the 1% level. Results are also relatively similar for overseas students (0.10 )
and for home-EU students (0.12 ). Both the coeﬃcients are precisely estimated
under the conventional significance levels. This part of the analysis while leading to
balanced precise estimates, does not improve our understanding of the mechanisms
behind the lack of persistence of the VA estimates.
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Students Evaluations of the DTAs
Figure 2.2 shows the correlation between DTAs value-added estimates and the stu-
dents’ evaluations of the DTAs. We regress the students’ evaluations of each DTA
in each course on their predicted value-added, controlling for Course ⇥ Year fixed
eﬀects. The correlation is positive and statistically significant, and is stronger for 2nd
year courses.22 Although we should be cautious not to over-interpret this diﬀerence,
its direction seems to suggest that 2nd year students are more precise in evaluating
DTA eﬀectiveness than 1st year students. Also, 2nd year students might be paying
more attention to the teachers because 2nd year courses carry higher weight.
Figure 2.2: DTA “value-added” vs. students evaluation of the DTA
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Notes: This table shows the correlation between DTA “value-added” vs. students evaluation of the
DTA. Left panel presents a scatter plot using the whole sample of analysis. Right panel presents
two scatter plots, one for each year of the undergraduate program. The fitted lines correspond to a
regression of the students evaluation score on the estimated DTA value-added, which also includes
Course ⇥ Year FE.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
The value-added approach is the most prominent method for evaluating teacher
quality. While studies using value-added models indicate that teacher quality is an
important determinant of student achievement in primary and secondary education
(Kane and Staiger (2008), Rothstein (2010b), Chetty et al. (2014b)), there is less
evidence for how the quality of instruction aﬀects student outcomes at the post-
22Results in table format are omitted for brevity considerations only, and are available upon
request.
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secondary level. This is because the exams are less likely to be standardized and
students and teachers are typically endogenously matched on the basis of their ability
(Carrell and West (2010), Braga et al. (2016)).
This paper studies a widely-employed but overlooked resource in post-secondary
education: doctoral teaching assistants. We argue the role and influence of DTAs on
student achievement is likely to be growing over time (Lusher et al. (2015)), and is
worth studying. We focus on a UK Economics undergraduate program. The sample
advances the research because: (i) Students are randomly assigned to classes; (ii)
we have access to a detailed individual database, which allows the first estimation
of doctoral teaching assistants’ value-added models.
We validate the empirical approach using a variety of tests to confirm the random
allocation of students to classes. We find that a one standard deviation change in
DTA quality increases students’ academic achievement by around 8.5 percent of
a standard deviation. A novel estimation of the within-course dynamics shows a
startling decay: Value-added estimates are larger for assessments taken during the
course, drop for end-of-term tests and are not statistically diﬀerent from zero for
final exams, implying that there is no variation in DTAs eﬀectiveness for the final
exams. Various robustness checks confirm that the lack of persistence of the VA
estimates is genuine and it is not driven by changes in the sample composition, nor
by outliers.
While previous research in post-secondary education has detected long-term
teacher-eﬀects for subsequent courses (taught by a diﬀerent teacher) and even in
the labor market (Braga et al. (2016)), in this study we find a sharp VA decay for
distinct evaluations within the same course taught by the same teacher. In general,
the persistence of the teacher eﬀects could reflect two main mechanisms (Jacob et
al. (2010)): (i) Students may make other investments that mitigate or exacerbate
the consequences of the assignment to a particular teacher; and (ii) students may
forget information or lose skills that they acquired under a particular teacher.
The analysis suggests that the short-term decay in the estimates might be driven
by students’ endogenous investments (mechanism 1). For example, students could
compensate for being assigned to a low-value-added DTA by working harder in the
self-guided study period. This increase in eﬀort could be amplified by the high
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weight of the final exam in the final mark. We also acknowledge that even in our
short time-frame, the lack of variation in DTAs’ eﬀectiveness detected in final exams
can be due to students losing skills that they acquired under a particular teacher
(mechanism 2). Finally, we believe that DTAs have very little power, experience, or
incentive to change their way of teaching, causing such dramatic changes in the VA
estimates across separate types of evaluations.23
Further research is warranted to better understand the sensitivity of value-added
estimates to a diﬀerent set of incentives aﬀecting students’ responses. Also, the
student sample is highly selected which may limit the external validity of this study.
We encourage more research into the interactions between students’ initial level of
ability, personal investments and sensitivity of the value-added estimates. Very little
is known in this area, providing promising avenues for future research.
23Carrell and West (2010) present evidence that professors who excel at promoting contempo-
raneous student achievement teach in ways that improve their student evaluations but harm the
follow-on achievement of their students in more advanced classes.
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Figures
Figure B.1: Distribution of students’ marks by type of evaluation
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Tables
Table B.1: Testing the random allocation (a VA approach on all sample of analysis)
(1) (2) (3)
Female Overseas Economics
DTA value-added 0.0102285 0 0
(0.0289321) (0) (0.1075076)
Observations 6,649 6,649 6,649
Number of DTAs 66 66 66
Number of classes 589 589 589
Course ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES
Class-level controls YES YES YES
Student-level controls YES YES YES
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard
errors reported in parenthesis are clustered at the DTA level. Outcome variables are gender
(column 1), overseas status (column 2) and enrolment in the Economics Department (column 3).
All outcomes are dummy variables. All the specifications include Course ⇥ Year FE, class-level
controls and individual-level controls. The procedure to obtain the “value-added” estimate and
related-confidence interval is explained in Section 2.3.
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Table B.2: Testing the random allocation ( 2 tests on all sample of analysis)
Female Overseas Economics
P   value < 5% P   value < 1% P   value < 5% P   value < 1% P   value < 5% P   value < 1%
(N failed / total tests) (N failed / total tests) (N failed / total tests)
The World Economy 0/4 0/4 0/4 0/4 1/4 1/4
Economics I 0/4 0/4 0/4 0/4 0/4 0/4
Macroeconomics I 0/4 0/4 0/4 0/4 0/4 0/4
Microeconomics I 0/4 0/4 1/4 0/4 0/4 0/4
Macroeconomics II 0/4 0/4 1/4 0/4 0/4 0/4
Microeconomics II 0/4 0/4 1/4 0/4 0/4 0/4
Economics II 0/4 0/4 0/4 0/4 1/4 0/4
Econometrics 0/4 0/4 1/4 1/4 0/4 0/4
Notes: In this test we run separate Probit regressions for each course/year, including class-specific dummies. Standard errors are clustered
at the DTA level. Outcome variables are gender (columns 1/2), overseas status (column 3/4) and enrolment in the Economics Department
(column 5/6). The null hypothesis is that the coeﬃcients on the class dummies in each model are jointly equal to zero. We have 32 tests for
each student characteristic, as we focus on 8 courses in 4 years. The test statistics are  2, with varying parameters depending on the number
of classes in each course/year. We report results at the 5% and at the 1% significance level.
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Table B.3: Robustness check clustering standard errors at diﬀerent levels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DTA value-added 0.0858 0.0858 0.0841 0.0866
SE (clustered tutor level) (0.0239)*** (0.0239)*** (0.0240)*** (0.0260)***
SE (non-clustered) (0.0139)*** (0.0139)*** (0.0139)*** (0.0144)***
SE (clustered student level) (0.0131)*** (0.0131)*** (0.0133)*** (0.0136)***
SE (clustered class level) (0.0136)*** (0.0136)*** (0.0139)*** (0.0144)***
Observations 24,914 24,914 24,914 24,914
Number of DTAs 66 66 66 66
Number of classes 589 589 589 589
Course ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES YES
Evaluation FE NO YES YES YES
Class-level controls NO NO YES YES
Student-level controls NO NO NO YES
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard
errors are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered at student level and class level were
computed using a bootstrap procedure. Bootstrap Standard errors were computed using 1,000
bootstrap samples. The sample includes Macroeconomics 1, Microeconomics 1, Economics 1, The
World Economy, Macroeconomics 2, Microeconomics 2, Economics 2, and Econometrics (from
2008/09 to 2011/12 included). Marks are standardised within type of evaluation/course/year to
have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Class-level controls include class size,
dummy variables for the day/time of the week, shares of peers in the class that were female, with
an overseas status, and who were enrolled in the Department of Economics. Student-level controls
include dummies for: gender, overseas status, and enrolment in the Department of Economics.
Column 1 includes Course ⇥ Year FE. Column 2 adds evaluation fixed-eﬀects. Column 3 adds
class-level controls. Column 4 adds student-level controls. The procedure to obtain the “value-
added” estimate and related-confidence interval is explained in Section 2.3.
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Table B.4: Robustness check including students observed in diﬀerent classes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DTA value-added 0.0854*** 0.0854*** 0.0833*** 0.0867***
(0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0245)
Observations 26,767 26,767 26,767 26,767
Number of DTAs 66 66 66 66
Number of classes 597 597 597 597
Course ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES YES
Evaluation FE NO YES YES YES
Class-level controls NO NO YES YES
Student-level controls NO NO NO YES
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard
errors reported in parenthesis are clustered at the DTA level. Marks are standardised within
type of evaluation/course/year to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The
sample of analysis includes students that are observed in multiple classes within the same course.
Given that there is no information regarding the initial allocation of these students, nor of the
actual class attended, we randomly selected one observation per student at course/year level.
That is, each student with multiple observations in diﬀerent classes (within the same course)
is randomly allocated to only one class. Column 1 includes Course ⇥ Year FE. We then add
sequentially evaluation fixed eﬀects, class-level controls, and student-level controls, as in Table 2.4.
The procedure to obtain the “value-added” estimate and related-confidence interval is explained in
Section 2.3.
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Table B.5: Robustness check on the sample including same DTAs and classes
(1) (2) (3)
Assessment Test Exam
DTA value-added 0.0985*** 0.0607*** 0
(0.0283) (0.0217) (0)
Observations 6,148 4,126 1,928
Number of DTAs 27 27 27
Number of classes 168 168 168
Course ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES
Class-level controls YES YES YES
Student-level controls YES YES YES
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard
errors reported in parenthesis are clustered at the DTA level. Marks are standardised within type
of evaluation/course/year to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The sample
includes courses that have assessments, end-of-term tests, and exams. These are Microeconomics
I and Econometrics. Focusing on these 2 courses ensures that VA estimates by type of evaluation
are obtained on a sample that includes the same tutors and classes. All the specifications include
Course ⇥ Year FE, class-level controls, and student-level controls. Column 1 shows the results for
assessment. Column 2 for end-of-term tests. Column 3 for final exams. The procedure to obtain
the “value-added” estimate and related-confidence interval is explained in Section 2.3.
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Table B.6: Robustness check excluding one course at the time (assessments only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DTA value-added 0.130*** 0.159*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.164*** 0.207***
(0.0339) (0.0439) (0.0599) (0.0444) (0.0520) (0.0475)
Observations 10,156 10,699 9,031 10,173 10,697 8,539
Number of DTAs 49 51 48 47 51 39
Number of classes 363 379 365 366 380 347
Course ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Class-level controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Student-level controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard er-
rors reported in parenthesis are clustered at the DTA level. Marks are standardised within type of
evaluation/course/year to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The sample includes
assessments only. The courses that have assessments are: The World Economy, Economics I, Microe-
conomics I, Macroeconomics II, Economics II and Econometrics. All the specifications include Course
⇥ Year FE, class-level controls, and student-level controls. Column 1 shows the results excluding The
World Economy from the sample. We then exclude sequentially: Economics I, Microeconomics I, Macroe-
conomics II, Economics II. The procedure to obtain the “value-added” estimate and related-confidence
interval is explained in Section 2.3.
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Table B.7: Robustness check on the sample of students enrolled in the Economics band
of the undergraduate program (L100)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled Assessment Test Exam
DTA value-added 0.107*** 0.192*** 0.0711** 7.60e-08
(0.0172) (0.0298) (0.0290) (2.30e-07)
Observations 16,197 7,113 4,934 4,150
Number of DTAs 57 46 40 57
Number of classes 460 316 305 460
Course ⇥ Year FE YES YES YES YES
Evaluation FE YES N/A N/A N/A
Class-level controls YES YES YES YES
Student-level controls YES YES YES YES
Notes: ***, ** , * Denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard
errors reported in parenthesis are clustered at the DTA level. The sample of analysis includes
only students that are enrolled in the Economics band of the undergraduate program. Marks
are standardised within type of evaluation/course/year to have a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one. Class-level controls include class size, dummy variables for the day/time of the
week, shares of peers in the class that were female, with an overseas status, and who were enrolled
in the Department of Economics. Student-level controls include dummies for: gender, and overseas
status. Column 1 reports “value-added” estimates for the pooled sample of evaluations, column
2 only for assessment, column 3 only for end-of-term tests, and column 4 only for final exams.
The procedure to obtain the “value-added” estimate and related-confidence interval is explained in
Section 2.3.
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Chapter 3
Points To Save Lives: The Eﬀects of
Traﬃc Enforcement Policies on Road
Fatalities
3.1 Introduction
Certain public policies aim to influence individual behavior to discourage harmful
activities such as crime, tax evasion or traﬃc violations. In this paper, we study the
eﬀects of a change in traﬃc enforcement policies for two reasons. First, reducing the
incidence of traﬃc accidents is a first-order public health issue in most countries.
According to recent estimates from the World Health Organization, more than one
million people die in car accidents each year worldwide (WHO (2013)), generating
an economic cost of approximately 1.5% of global GDP. Hence, better enforcement
policies have the potential to yield large economic and social gains at a potentially
low cost. A second reason to study the impact of traﬃc enforcement policies is that
the key outcome variables in this setting, such as the number of accidents or road
fatalities, are directly observable and collected in a standardized way across many
countries. This is in contrast with tax evasion or crime, which are only imperfectly
observed and therefore much harder to quantify.
In recent decades, many countries have implemented penalty points systems
(PPS) to administer driving licences. Under a PPS, drivers are allocated a fixed
number of points that they can lose if they commit traﬃc violations. Losing all
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points can result in the suspension of the driving licence for a period of time, or
its permanent withdrawal.1 According to the theoretical analysis of Bourgeon and
Picard (2007), the PPS contributes to reducing the gap between the private and
social valuation of the cost of traﬃc accidents, which the judicial system and the
insurance market fail to address. By doing this, the PPS achieves two social objec-
tives. First, it screens reckless drivers to ensure that they lose their licence. Second,
it acts as a deterrence mechanism for normal drivers. Their analysis also shows that
complementing this nonmonetary sanction system with moderate fines, as is usually
done is most countries, is likely to increase overall welfare.
We study the eﬀects of the introduction of a penalty points system in Spain
in 2006 on road fatalities. Since the reform was introduced at the national level,
it is challenging to find a suitable counterfactual to estimate the eﬀect on drivers’
behavior and mortality rates. Traditionally, case studies have chosen a set of “rea-
sonably” similar units (e.g., cities or States) to form a counterfactual (for example,
Card (1990), Card and Krueger (1994)). A problem with these case studies is that
the choice of the counterfactual group is to some extent arbitrary.
We use the synthetic control method developed by Abadie and Gardeazábal
(2003) and Abadie et al. (2010). The basic idea of this method is to build a coun-
terfactual using a weighted average of all potential control units for which data
is available. The set of potential controls is called the “donor pool”. Each of the
units in the donor pool is assigned a nonnegative weight in the synthetic group and,
by construction, these weights must add up to one. Following this procedure, the
method makes explicit the contribution of each comparison unit to the counterfac-
tual of interest. Having constructed the counterfactual, measuring the impact of
the policy simply requires comparing the evolution of road fatalities in Spain to the
same aggregate variable for the synthetic Spain.
The main advantage of the synthetic control method over traditional case studies
is the rigorous way in which the control group is chosen. By requiring only the use
of pre-intervention data, the method is “blind” about the impact of the choices made
to select the counterfactual on the final estimates. Moreover, the restriction that
1In some countries, the policy is called “Demerit Points System” (DPS), where drivers start
out with zero points and they accumulate them with traﬃc oﬀenses. In that case, the licence is
withdrawn when a certain number of points is reached.
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the weights of each unit must be nonnegative and add up to one implies that there
is no use of extrapolation to build the counterfactual, something that often occurs
in linear regression analysis (sometimes inadvertently). Under certain assumptions
that we describe in more detail in Section 3.3, the synthetic control method provides
a compelling identification strategy to evaluate the impact of the PPS in Spain.
To build the synthetic control group, we use data on several predictors of road
fatalities for all EU-15 countries, excluding Spain.2 Our newly-constructed dataset
includes annual data on alcohol consumption, road density, GDP per capita, fuel
consumption, and the stock of vehicles, among other variables, for the period 1990-
2011. The main source of data is the World Road Statistics report, produced by the
International Road Federation.3 We describe the dataset in more detail in Section
3.2.2.
Our main finding is that annual road fatalities in Spain declined substantially
between 2006 and 2011 as a result of the introduction of the PPS. By 2011, there
were 4.4 road fatalities per 100,000 people in Spain, compared to 7.2 in the syn-
thetic control group (a 39% diﬀerence). We estimate the cumulative reduction in
road fatalities over that period to be approximately 20%, a very substantial eﬀect.
This is an interesting result, given that previous research has found short-run eﬀects
of traﬃc enforcement policies on drivers behavior, but these eﬀects start to decline
rapidly (Abouk and Adams (2013)). Following the implementation of the PPS, it
was a sharply increase in the number of driving licenses suspended by the judiciary
authority. This evidence might suggests that the persistent reduction in road fa-
talities could not only be driven by deterring a risky-driving behavior, but also by
taking reckless drivers out of the roads.
We conduct two placebo exercises to check the robustness of this result. First,
we evaluate the estimated eﬀect under the assumption that the PPS was adopted
2The term EU-15 refers to the members of the European Union during the period 1995-2004,
namely: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
3The International Road Federation is a non-profit organization based in Switzerland focused
on “promoting the development and maintenance of better, safer and more sustainable roads and
road networks”. In consultation with national statistical institutes, it collects comprehensive data
on road networks, traﬃc and inland transport all over the world. For more information, see
www.irfnews.org.
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by Spain in the year 2000 (six years before the actual implementation). We find
no eﬀect of this placebo policy on road deaths in Spain. As a second placebo test,
we estimate the eﬀect of a hypothetical adoption of the PPS in 2006 in each of the
countries in the donor pool. We would expect the gap between road fatalities in
each of these countries and their synthetic controls to be zero on average. Indeed,
we find that the negative eﬀect on road fatalities estimated for Spain stands out as
the largest of all. These two placebo tests strongly suggest that our main findings
are not due to pure chance.
Finally, we use our year-by-year estimates of the number of lives saved due to
the PPS to calculate the economic benefits derived from this policy. During the
five-year period after its adoption, the PPS prevented approximately 3,500-4,000
road fatalities (depending on the donor pool used in the estimation). According to
Abellán et al. (2009), the value of a statistical life (VSL) in Spain is estimated to
be in the vicinity of e1.3 million ($1.82 million). Therefore, we estimate that the
PPS yielded an economic benefit of e4.6-5.1 billion ($6.0-6.7 billion) in its first five
years of implementation, which corresponds to 0.43-0.48% of Spain’s GDP.
Previous Literature
Economists have long been interested in the eﬀects of traﬃc enforcement policies on
individual behavior. Since the pioneering work of Peltzman (1975), researchers have
analyzed the eﬀects of mandatory seat belt laws (Evans (1986), Cohen and Einav
(2003)), minimum legal drinking age (Lovenheim and Slemrod (2010)), minimum
wage policies and alcohol-related traﬃc accidents (Adams et al. (2012)), banning
text messaging while driving (Abouk and Adams (2013)), fines and experience-
rated insurance premiums (Dionne et al. (2011)), motorcycle helmet mandates (Dee
(2009)), smoking bans in bars (Adams and Cotti (2008)), and the regulation of bar’s
opening hours (Green et al. (2014)), among others.
Some studies have focused specifically on the eﬀects of penalty points system
in diﬀerent countries. DePaola et al. (2013) study the eﬀects of the PPS in Italy,
using a regression discontinuity design in which the assignment variable is time.
They compare the number of road accidents and fatalities just before and after the
introduction of the new law, estimating a 9% fall in traﬃc accidents and a 18-30%
98
reduction in road fatalities. Several studies have attempted to evaluate the eﬀects
of the penalty points system (PPS) in Spain. These studies use monthly traﬃc
statistics4 and employ a variety of time-series techniques to address the issue of
seasonality in the road fatalities data, such as controling nonlinearly for long-run
trends and other variables associated to traﬃc accidents. Castillo-Manzano et al.
(2010) estimate that the PPS led to a 12.6% reduction in the number of deaths on
highway accidents (not weighted by population). Novoa et al. (2010) find a 10%
reduction in the risk of death or serious injury in highway accidents for drivers.
Pulido et al. (2010) estimate a 14.5% reduction in the number of road fatalities in
the 18 months following the implementation of the PPS. Even though the outcome
variable is slightly diﬀerent in each study, the general conclusion from this set of
studies is that the PPS reduced mortality in traﬃc accidents by 10-14% in the 18-24
months after the introduction of the policy.
The time-series methods used in these early analyses of the Spanish PPS have
several limitations. First, they may not control adequately for long-run trends in
road fatalities that are unrelated to the introduction of the PPS, for example a
change in the pace of improvement in vehicles’ safety features or road quality. During
the decade starting in 2000, there was a generalized decline in the number of road
fatalities across all countries in the EU-15. Failing to account for this trend could
introduce a negative bias in the estimated eﬀects of the Spanish PPS on fatalities,
i.e. overestimating the eﬀects of the policy. Even though we do not observe the
factors behind these trends directly, we eﬀectively control for them by using other
EU-15 countries (likely aﬀected by similar shocks as Spain) to build the synthetic
control group. Second, controling for seasonality in road fatalities is diﬃcult unless
the time series used is very long, but the studies mentioned above focus on the period
between January 2000 and December 2007, which is not long enough to accurately
capture the seasonal swings in road fatalities. In this study, we use annual frequency
data so we avoid having to deal with the varying seasonal patterns across EU-15
countries (e.g., due to diﬀerences in weather conditions and holiday schedules).
The key contribution of this paper to the literature is to use the synthetic control
4Specifically, the monthly data on traﬃc accidents and fatalities in Spain is published by the
General Directorate of Traﬃc (Dirección General de Tráfico, DGT).
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method, which provides a more reliable estimate of the medium-term eﬀect of the
penalty points system in Spain. A second contribution of the paper is the cost-
benefit evaluation of the PPS, using estimates of the value of a statistical life. In
the Spanish case, the cost-benefit analysis indicates that the PPS yielded substantial
economic as well as human benefits with a very low cost of implementation (DGT
(2011)), suggesting that countries without such a system should consider adopting
it in the future.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the institu-
tional background and the dataset. Section 3.3 summarizes the synthetic control
method. Section 3.4 presents the main results. Section 3.5 provides some additional
discussion of the results, including the cost-benefit analysis using estimates of the
value of a statistical life (VSL). Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Background and Data
3.2.1 The Spanish Penalty Points System (PPS)
The penalty points system (PPS) reform was enacted by the Spanish parliament
on July 19th, 2005 and became eﬀective on July 1st, 2006. The reform was widely
discussed in the media, received almost unanimous support from all political parties,
and was publicized through an extensive information campaign in the media (DGT
(2011)).
In the Spanish PPS, drivers start out with 12 points (eight for newly-licensed
drivers) that they can lose if they commit traﬃc violations. Some examples are
speeding violations (two to six points depending on the severity of the oﬀense),
drunk driving (four to six points) or using the mobile phone while driving (three
points). If a driver loses all points, their driving licence is suspended for a period of
six months. Until 2011, 107,000 drivers had lost their licence, corresponding to 0.4%
of all existing licences (DGT (2011)). Penalized drivers can recover their licence after
going through traﬃc safety workshops organized by the traﬃc authorities. Losing
all points for a second time may result in the permanent withdrawal of the driving
licence.
Oﬃcial government reports state that the main goal of the policy was to modify
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driving behavior through non-monetary penalties, seen as a necessary complement
to the existing (and essentially unchanged) regime of monetary penalties (DGT
(2011)). Additionally, they expressed the intention of shifting to individual drivers
the responsibility of retaining their licence through good behavior.
Several other EU-15 countries have implemented similar points programs, as
shown in Table 3.1. West Germany was the first country to implement such a system
in 1974, followed by France in 1992, Greece in 1993, and the United Kingdom in
1995. As we explain below, we exclude some countries where the PPS was introduced
around the same time as in Spain fromt the donor pool to ensure that they do not
bias the results.
Table 3.1: Penalty Points Systems by Year of Adoption
Country Year of Adoption Type of System
Germany (West) 1974 Demerit
France 1992 Demerit
Greece 1993 Gain
United Kingdom 1995 Gain
Ireland 2001 Gain
Luxembourg 2002 Demerit
Italy 2003 Demerit
Netherlands 2003 Gain
Austria 2005 Take into account recidivism
Denmark 2005 Gain
Spain 2006 Demerit
Belgium - -
Finland - -
Portugal - -
Sweden - -
Source: European Transport Safety Council (2011).
3.2.2 Data
We construct a new dataset of traﬃc-related statistics for EU-15 countries using
multiple data sources, for the period 1990-2011. For data on traﬃc fatalities,5 road
network quality, the stock of four- and two-wheeled vehicles and other characteristics
5Fatalities are measured under the internationally standardized “30-day” measure, which counts
any deaths within the first 30 days after the accident.
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at the country level, we use the World Road Statistics (WRS), a report published
by the International Road Federation.6 For all these variables, we calculate the
outcomes per 100,000 people, using population from the World Bank Open Data.
We also use GDP figures in US dollars from the same source. Finally, we collect
data on alcohol consumption per capita, a strong predictor of road accidents, from
the OECD iLibrary.
The final dataset has some limitations. Even though the IRF makes an eﬀort
to collect homogeneous data across countries, there is a substantial proportion of
missing values for certain variables that would have been good predictors of road
accidents. For example, incomplete information about the annual volume of road
traﬃc in each country prevents us from using this variable in the set of predictors of
road fatalities. For some other variables, the number of missing values is limited to
some specific country-year observations. In all cases where there are no more than
two consecutive missing values, we use linear extrapolation to fill the gaps in the
data so that we can include those variables in the analysis.
Another limitation is the relatively small sample size, as we have data for 15
countries over 22 years (N = 330). This is not uncommon in the synthetic control
literature. For example, in the seminal paper by Abadie and Gardeazábal (2003), the
sample size consisted of 17 Spanish regions, and the synthetic group included only
two regions. As we explain below in more detail, this is less critical in this setting
than in a linear regression context. The reason is that we are using aggregate data,
so there is no statistical uncertainty about the representativeness of the sample, as
noted by Abadie et al. (2010). Therefore, we do not construct confidence intervals
around the point estimates in same way that we would when using a sample of
data. However, there is a diﬀerent source of uncertainty regarding the precision of
the estimates and their statistical significance, which depends on the validity of the
sythetic control group. As we show below, the results are robust to a number of
placebo checks.
Finally, our data has annual frequency instead of monthly. Even though this
may seem to be a limitation because it reduces the eﬀective sample size, notice that
annual data does not feature seasonality, removing a potential source of bias from
6See Foonote 2 above.
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the estimation. For this reason, we argue that the advantages of monthly data are
somewhat overstated in the earlier studies on this topic reviewed above. Having 15
years of complete pre-intervention data allows us to construct the counterfactual for
Spain using the synthetic control method.
3.3 Synthetic Control Method
In this section we provide a formal description of the synthetic control method. For
a more comprehensive treatment, please see Abadie et al. (2010).
Assume we observe J + 1 countries over T periods, and let country 1 (in this
case, Spain) receive an intervention in period tI < T , so that this country is exposed
to the treatment during periods tI +1, ..., T . Let Yit be the value of the outcome for
country i in year t, and let Y Nit be the value that would have been observed in the
absence of the intervention. The goal is to estimate the eﬀect of the intervention
on the treated country, that is ↵1t = Y1t   Y N1t , for the post-intervention periods
t 2 (tI + 1, ..., T ). Since Y N1t is not observed in the post-intervention period, we
need to estimate a counterfactual.
The key idea of the synthetic control method is to construct this counterfactual
using a linear combination of the potential control units. For this purpose, we define
the vector W 0 = (w2, ..., wJ+1), which contains the weights that will be assigned to
each unit in the donor pool. We impose that these weights must be nonnegative
and sum up to one:
wj   0, 8 j 2 (2, ..., J + 1) (3.1)
J+1X
j=2
wj = 1 (3.2)
These two conditions guarantee that the comparison group is constructed with-
out using extrapolation, as emphasized by Abadie et al. (2010). The optimal vector
of weights is chosen to minimize the distance between the characteristics of the syn-
thetic control and the treated country. Let X1 be a (k⇥1) vector of pre-intervention
characteristics of the treated country. Similarly, define the (k⇥ j) matrix X0, which
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contains the same variables for the untreated countries. Thus, the vector W ⇤0 =
(w⇤2, ..., w⇤J+1) is chosen to minimize:
min ||X1  X0W ||V =
p
(X1  X0W )0V (X1  X0W ) s.t. eqs. (3.1) and (3.2) (3.3)
where V is a (k ⇥ k)) symmetric and positive semidefinite matrix. In general,
V is a diagonal matrix with main diagonal elements (v1, ..., vk), where vl represents
the relative weight assigned to the l-th pre-intervention variable when measuring
the distance between the treated country and the synthetic group. Thus, if Xjl
represents the value of the l-th pre-intervention variable for country j, the optimal
weights w⇤2, ..., w⇤J+1 minimize:7
kX
l=1
vl (X1l  
J+1X
j=2
wjXjl)
2 (3.4)
In other words, the weights are chosen to minimize the diﬀerence in pre-intervention
characteristics between the synthetic control and the treated country. Under the
assumption that a large-enough period of pre-intervention data is available (i.e.,
tI   0), an approximately unbiased estimator for the parameter of interest ↵1t is
given by:
b↵1t = Y1t   J+1X
j=2
w⇤jYjt for t = (tI+1, ..., T ) (3.5)
We can also express the cumulative eﬀect in the k years after the intervention
as:
tI+kX
t=tI
b↵1t = tI+kX
t=tI
 
Y1t  
J+1X
j=2
w⇤jYjt
!
(3.6)
7In order to ensure that the counterfactual resembles the treated country, both in terms of the
pre-treatment characteristics and the outcome of interest, Abadie et al. (2010) suggest the use of
lagged values of the outcome variable in the process of obtaining the optimal weights.
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3.4 Results
We implement the estimation routine outlined above using the synth command for
Stata, developed by Abadie et al. (2010).8
3.4.1 Composition of the Synthetic Control Group
We consider two alternative donor pools: i) All EU-15 countries excluding Spain,
ii) and the subsample of countries that do not have a penalty points system (PPS)
or adopted it before the year 1996. The reason for restricting the donor pool in
ii) is that the subset of countries that adopted the PPS around the same time as
Spain could potentially contaminate the synthetic group, because we expect the
policy to have an eﬀect on their road fatalities. We keep in the data countries that
had adopted the PPS before 1996 because it is unlikely that the policy still has a
relevant eﬀect on changes in road fatalities more than ten years after its introduction
(although we would expect it to have an impact the level of that outcome).
Table 3.2 reports the weights assigned to each country under the two alternative
donor pools. The first column shows the weight when all countries are included in the
donor pool. The country with the highest weight in the synthetic Spain is Portugal
(0.35). This is not surprising, given that Portugal is a neighboring country that
shares many geographic and cultural characteristics with Spain. Other countries
with substantial weights are Belgium (0.25), Sweden (0.17), Italy (0.16), Greece
(0.07) and Luxembourg (0.006).
The second column of Table 3.2 reports the weights when the donor pool is
restricted to avoid contamination from the introduction of similar penalty points
systems in other countries. This reduces the donor sample to eight countries, and
it changes significantly the composition of the synthetic Spain. France, another
country that shares a border with Spain, receives a high weight (0.30), although
the highest goes to Belgium (0.42). Portugal’s weight reduces to only (0.02), while
Finland (0.18) and Greece (0.09) also receive a positive weight.
8More information about the command for Stata and other software platforms is available here.
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Table 3.2: Country weights for Synthetic Spain
Donor Pool
Country All No PPS (or adopted
countries before 1996)
Austria 0 -
Belgium 0.245 0.415
Denmark 0 -
Finland 0 0.176
France 0 0.300
Germany 0 0
Greece 0.070 0.093
Ireland 0 -
Italy 0.162 -
Luxembourg 0.006 -
Netherlands 0 -
Portugal 0.351 0.016
Sweden 0.166 0
United Kingdom 0 0
Notes: This table reports the weights assigned to each country using the synthetic control method
explained in Section 3.3. By construction, the weights are nonnegative and must add up to one.
In the first column, the pool of donors contains all EU-15 countries excluding Spain. In the second
column, the pool of donors contains the subset of countries that have never adopted a penalty
points system (PPS) or adopted it before the year 1996.
Table 3.3 reports summary statistics for all the predictors of road deaths in
the pre-intervention period (1990-2005). We also report the average of the main
outcome variable, road deaths per 100,000 people, for the years 1995, 2000 and 2005.
The first column reports the actual values for Spain, the second for the synthetic
Spain constructed using all potential control countries, the third for the synthetic
Spain using only the uncontaminated subset, and the fourth shows the (unweighted)
averages for all 14 potential donors.
The two synthetic controls do a reasonably good job at matching the values of
the predictors of the true Spain. This is partly due to the fact that EU-15 countries
are fairly homogeneous on many socioeconomic characteristics. However, the limited
size of the donor pools implies that some of the values do not match perfectly. The
diﬀerences between Spain and synthetic Spain are below 10% (which we consider a
good match) for log GDP per capita, alcohol consumption per capita, kilometers of
total and secondary roads, number of four-wheel vehicles and diesel consumption.
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The match is less precise for the number of motorcycles, petrol consumption and
road density. For these three variables, Spain has lower values than the two syn-
thetic controls. Despite these diﬀerences, the average values of the main outcome
of interest–road deaths per 100,000 people–are matched almost perfectly at three
diﬀerent years in the pre-intervention period (1995, 2000 and 2005). This provides
reassurance that the synthetic control method is performing quite well in both cases,
despite the sample size limitations.
3.4.2 Main Results
Figure 3.1 shows that the two alternative synthetic control groups track the evolution
of road fatalities per 100,000 people in Spain for the entire pre-intervention period.
The top panel compares Spain against the synthetic Spain constructed using all
other EU-15 countries. The two trend lines follow each other closely in the pre-
intervention period (1990-2005), featuring a pronounced decline of road deaths per
100,000 people from about 17.9 in 1990 to 9.4 in 2005. After the PPS was introduced
in Spain (in July 2006), the country experienced an even further decline in road
deaths down to 4.4 fatalities per 100,000 people in the year 2011, compared to a
value of 7.2 for the synthetic Spain.
The bottom panel of Figure 3.1 shows the trends for Spain and the second
synthetic Spain, constructed using the restricted donor pool. As in the top panel,
the pre-intervention trends in road deaths are very similar. The evidence of an eﬀect
of the PPS starting in the year 2006 is clear, and the divergence between Spain and
the synthetic control by the year 2011 is essentially the same, as the alternative
synthetic Spain has 7.1 deaths per 100,000 people.
These results imply that the PPS led to a large reduction in road fatalities in
Spain during the first five years of application of the penalty points system. Table
3.4 reports the evolution of road fatalities per 100,000 people in Spain and the two
alternative synthetic control groups for the period 2007-2011. By 2011, the incidence
of road fatalities in Spain was 39% lower than that of synthetic Spain (4.41 vs. 7.23).
The percentage diﬀerence is very similar regardless of the donor pool used.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics: Spain vs. Synthetic Spain
Synthetic Spain
Spain All No PPS (or adopted Average of all
countries before 1996) potential donors
Log GDP per capita (USD) 9.71 10.08 9.86 10.13
Alcohol consumption per capita (lts.) 11.34 11.60 10.47 11.24
Total roads (km. per 100,000) 1,211.45 1,427.75 1,158.04 1,283.57
Secondary roads (km. per 100,000) 344.30 311.73 325.79 313.46
Road density, (sq. km. per 100,000) 0.002 0.022 0.018 0.049
Four-wheel vehicles (per 100,000) 48,009.24 47,910.01 45,699.48 46,941.76
Motorcycles (per 100,000) 4,453.86 4,790.38 5,603.44 4,727.66
Diesel consumption (lts. per 100,000) 43.31 41.20 37.79 49.60
Petrol consumption (lts. per 100,000) 20.83 26.68 29.24 44.13
Road deaths, 2005 (per 100,000 people) 9.40 9.67 9.74 8.44
Road deaths, 2000 (per 100,000 people) 14.35 13.05 13.63 11.38
Road deaths, 1995 (per 100,000 people) 14.60 13.77 15.15 12.58
Road deaths, 1990 (per 100,000 people) 17.88 17.99 17.82 14.89
Notes: All variables are averaged for the 1990-2005 period, except road deaths which is evaluated in three
specific years. GDP per capita is measured in US dollars. Alcohol consumption is measured in litres
per person/year. Total and secondary roads are measured in kilometers per 1,000 people. Road density
is measured in squared km. per 100,000 people. The number of four-wheel vehicles and motorcycles is
measured in units per 100,000 people. Diesel and petrol consumption are measured in litres per 100,000
people and year. Road deaths are measured under the standardized 30-day measure, which counts any
deaths due to traﬃc accidents in the 30 days after the accident. In the second column, the pool of donors
contains all EU-15 countries excluding Spain. In the third column, the pool of donors contains the subset
of countries that do not have a penalty points system (PPS) or adopted the policy before 1996. The fourth
column shows the (unweighted) averages for all 14 potential donors.
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Figure 3.1: Road Deaths over Time: Spain vs. “synthetic” Spain
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Notes: To construct the top panel, we construct the synthetic control using all EU-15 countries
excluding Spain. For the bottom panel, we use only the 8 countries without a penalty points
system (PPS) and those that adopted it before 1996. The vertical dotted line indicates that the
policy was enacted the year 2006.
If we focus on the cumulative diﬀerence over the first five years of implementation
of the PPS, the diﬀerence is approximately 20% (30.78 vs. 38.43). These are sub-
stantial point estimates of the medium-term impact of the policy. The cumulative
impact is almost twice as large as that estimated by earlier studies (discussed in the
introduction), which focused on the short-term impact 18-24 months immediately
after the introduction of the PPS. The last two columns of Table 3.4 report the
annual diﬀerence in road fatalities per 100,000 between Spain and the two synthetic
controls. We use these estimates of the number of lives saved due to the PPS to
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calculate the economic benefits of the policy in Section 3.5.
Table 3.4: Road Fatalities after PPS Adoption: Spain vs. “synthetic” Spain
Synthetic Spain Diﬀerence Spain vs. Synthetic Spain
Year Spain All No PPS (or adopted All No PPS (or adopted
countries before 1996) countries before 1996)
2007 8.45 8.66 9.09 -0.20 -0.63
2008 6.75 7.77 8.20 -1.02 -1.45
2009 5.85 7.36 7.85 -1.50 -1.99
2010 5.32 7.41 7.12 -2.09 -1.80
2011 4.41 7.23 7.09 -2.83 -2.68
2007-2011 30.78 38.43 39.34 -7.65 -8.56
Notes: Road deaths are measured per 100,000 people under the standardized 30-day measure,
which counts any deaths due to traﬃc accidents in the 30 days after the accident. “All Countries”
indicates that the donor pool contains all EU-15 countries excluding Spain. “No PPS (or adopted
before 1996)” indicates that the donor pool contains the subset of countries that do not have a
penalty points system (PPS) or adopted the policy before 1996, i.e. at least ten years before Spain.
Following the implementation of the PPS, it was a sharply increase in the number
of driving licenses suspended by the judiciary authority. Appendix Figure C.1 shows
the number of driving licenses suspended between 2000 and 2009, adjusted by pop-
ulation size. Appendix Table C.1 lays out the number of driving licenses suspended
during the same period separately by the length of the suspension.9 After 2006, the
number of suspensions suddenly rose from approximately 77 to 121 driving licenses
per 100,000 people, representing a 63.63% increment in 4 years. This evidence might
suggest that the persistent reduction in road fatalities could not only be driven by
the impact of the PPS on deterring a risky-driving behavior, but also by its eﬀect
on taking reckless drivers out of the roads.
3.4.3 Placebo Tests and Statistical Significance
We now turn to analyzing the robustness of the results using a series of placebo
tests as suggested by Abadie et al. (2010). First, we test whether we would find an
eﬀect by assuming that the PPS was introduced in Spain in the year 2000, six years
before its actual introduction. Appendix Figure C.2 shows the trends for Spain
9This information is provided by the Spanish Directorate General for Traﬃc (DGT (2009)).
110
and synthetic Spain using the two alternative donor pools, as before. Recall that
the method uses pre-intervention data to match the behavior of the main outcome
variable in the treated country with the synthetic control.10 In both cases, the
match before 2000 is reasonably good. If the penalty points system had actually
been passed in 2000, we would have expected the two lines to start diverging right
after that year. However, in the two panels of appendix Figure C.2 we observe that
both synthetic controls continue following the trend for Spain quite closely until
2006, when the policy was actually enacted. After that year, the two lines start
diverging significantly, with the true Spain featuring a steeper downward trend after
2006. This suggests that the large eﬀect obtained for the 2006 reform was not due
to chance.
Second, we compare the gap in road fatalities in Spain vs. synthetic Spain against
the gaps that we obtain by assuming that the policy had been introduced in each
country in the donor pool exactly in the same year, 2006. For this exercise, we only
use the subset of countries that do not have a PPS or adopted it before 1996. Hence,
appendix Figure C.3 shows the gap between road deaths per 100,000 people in each
country vs. its synthetic control, assuming that a penalty points system (PPS) was
enacted in the year 2006 (marked by the vertical dotted line). Since the policy was
only enacted in that year for Spain, for the other eight countries shown in the figure
we would expect the gap to be zero even after 2006. Despite the fact that there are
large swings in the gap for two of the countries,11 by far the largest negative gap in
2011 corresponds to Spain (marked with the red solid line in the graph).
Following Abadie et al. (2010), we interpret this second placebo exercise to be
prima facie evidence that the estimated eﬀect of the policy is statistically significant.
The argument is that, of all possible countries to which we could have applied the
same estimation strategy, the eﬀect found for Spain is the largest. Since there were
nine countries (Spain plus the eight countries in the restricted donor pool), the
statistical significance in this case is approximately 11% (= 1/9).
10This implies that the composition of the synthetic control changes (and therefore, the weights
assigned to each unit in the donor pool), given that we moved the implementation date of the
policy. Appendix Table C.2 reports the sets of weights used in this placebo test.
11The country with a large positive gap is Greece, the one with a large negative gap is Portugal.
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3.4.4 Synthetic Control Group Weights and Potential Con-
founders
Table 3.2 reports the weights assigned to each country under the two alternative
donor pools. There is an important diﬀerence in the weight received by Portugal
across these two groups. To study if our results are driven by changes in the compo-
sition of the donor pool, we re-estimate the eﬀect of the PPS by excluding from the
donor pool one country at a time. Country weights for the fourteen synthetic Spain
resulted from this exercise are reported in appendix Table C.3, while the comparison
of these synthetic control groups against Spain is presented in appendix Figure C.4.
Even though in some cases there is variation in the weight assigned to a country
across the diﬀerent synthetic control groups, the permanent decline in road fatalities
after the implementation of the PPS is present in all specifications.
The persistent reduction in road fatalities could also been explained by other fac-
tors changing at the same time as the PPS, confounding the eﬀect of this policy on
road fatalities. For example, changes in the expenditure on new roads construction
could be a potential confounder. An increase in the number of roads could reduce
traﬃc density, diminishing the probability of traﬃc accidents. In addition, an in-
crease in the expenditure on road maintenance could also reduce traﬃc accidents,
due to an improvement of the roads. Unfortunately, we do not have information
on road expenditure for all EU-15 countries, and therefore we cannot use this in-
formation in the construction of our synthetic counterfactual. Nevertheless, we do
have this information for Spain, which allows us to study potential changes in trends
that coincide with the implementation of the PPS. Appendix Figure C.5 shows the
road expenditure in Spain on new construction and maintenance. Road expenditure
on new construction does not follow a clear trend over the whole period, while ex-
penditure on road maintenance shows an upward trend that starts much before the
implementation of the PPS. Moreover, expenditure in both new road construction
and road maintenance experience a decline from 2009 onwards, due to the global
economic recession. This reduction on road expenditure should likely increase the
number of road fatalities. Instead, we observe a reduction of road fatalities during
this period. Hence, this evidence suggests that changes in road expenditure is not
a relevant mechanism behind our results.
112
Changes in the Spanish economic activity could be another potential confounder
of the eﬀect of the PPS on road fatalities (Adams and Cotti (2008), Adams et al.
(2012)). Even though we already included the GDP per capita as one of the pre-
intervention variables in the construction of our synthetic counterfactual, we analize
any potential change in its trend that could coincide with the implementation of
the PPS. Appendix Figure C.6 shows the evolution of the GDP per capita in Spain.
Since 2001 up to 2008, there is a remarkable upward trend. Nevertheless, the Spanish
GDP per capita starts to decline in 2009 due to the global economic recession. If this
drop in the Spanish economic activity had been a main driver of the reduction in
road fatalities, we wouldn’t have observed a declaine in road fatalities during 2006,
2007 and 2008.
3.5 Discussion of Economic Benefits of the Policy
Our estimate of a 20% reduction in road fatalities in the five years after the adoption
of the PPS in Spain is substantially larger than earlier estimates (Castillo-Manzano
et al. (2010), Novoa et al. (2010), Pulido et al. (2010)), which found reductions in
road mortality in the vicinity of 10-15%. As discussed in the introduction, these
studies were not able to adequately control for other factors that may have aﬀected
road safety over time in all EU countries simultaneously, such as the pace of improve-
ments in vehicle safety technology. By providing a more compelling counterfactual,
the synthetic control method removes the attenuation bias present in previous stud-
ies. It is also worth noting that these studies focus on the short-run eﬀects of the
policy, since they only use data for the two years after its adoption. In this study,
we use data until 2011, which allows us to focus on the medium-term eﬀects of the
policy. This diﬀerence in the length of the evaluation period could also explains the
discrepancy between previous estimates and our findings. Evidence regarding driv-
ing license suspensions suggests that the persistent reduction in road fatalities could
be partly driven by taking reckless drivers out of the roads, which might explains
even larger eﬀects in the reduction in road fatalities in later years.
In order to do a cost-benefit analysis of the PPS, we separately estimate the
benefits and costs of the policy for society as a whole. On the benefit side, we use
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estimates of the value of a statistical life (VSL) to obtain an economic equivalent of
the number of lives saved. The value of a statistical life is the amount of money that
individuals or societies are willing to spend to save a human life. This concept has a
long history in the economics literature, and there are multiple estimates for many
countries (see Viscusi (1993), Viscusi and Aldy (2003), Orley Ashenfelter (2004),
Ashenfelter (2006)). Estimates of the VSL are used extensively by governments to
evaluate public policies related to health and other risks.
In Spain, the Directorate General for Traﬃc (DGT) commissioned a report to
estimate the VSL in order to perform cost-benefit analyses of their policies (Abellán
et al. (2009)). The central estimates of the VSL obtained by this team of researchers
is e1.3 million per life ($1.69 million at the 2011 exchange rate).
Multiplying these values by the number of lives saved each year between 2007
and 2011 (for the complete donor pool), we obtain a total benefit of e4.6 billion ($6
billion) over this five-year period. This is equivalent to 0,43% of the annual Spanish
GDP. The figures for the restricted donor pool are slightly larger: 5.1 billion ($6.7
billion), which is equivalent to 0,48% of GDP. These economic benefits are close to
0.1% of GDP each year. The figures suggest an extremely high return of this policy
in economic and human terms.
Even though there are no oﬃcial estimates of the cost of implementing the
penalty points system in Spain, the available information suggests that the cost
was an order of magnitude smaller than the estimated benefits. A report by the Di-
rectorate General of Traﬃc (DGT (2011)) explains that the information campaign at
the time of introduction of the policy received a substantial amount of free publicity
in the media (especially on TV and the written press), which allowed the DGT to
make large savings on advertising. Moreover, the traﬃc re-education courses through
which where oﬀending drivers can recover their points charge tuition fees, so the net
cost of these courses for the authorities is also limited.12 Therefore, we argue that
the economic benefits estimated above can be considered a good approximation of
the net benefit of the penalty points system.
12One could also argue that the costs for sanctioned drivers of attending the courses or having
their license withdrawn should be included in the overall welfare calculation, but these costs are
likely to be dwarfed by the benefits to society of having fewer accidents.
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3.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied the impact of the introduction of a penatly points system
in Spain on mortality from traﬃc accidents. We have found a large and significant
reduction in road fatalities by 20% over a five-year period, about twice as large as
the estimates from earlier studies. Evidence suggests that the persistent reduction
in road fatalities might not only be driven by the success of the PPS in deterring a
risky-driving behavior, but also by taking reckless drivers out of the roads.
The results suggest that other countries, especially those currently in the middle
and low-income categories, should consider adopting similar policies in order to
reduce the mortality on their roads. Of course, this conclusion must come with
the caveat that the context also matters: Spain is a highly-developed country with
modern infrastructure and government institutions capable of managing sophisticed
information systems to monitor millions of drivers.
More research is needed to understand the specific mechanisms that made the
penalty points system so eﬀective in Spain. Researchers could exploit some variation
in traﬃc enforcement across regions in order to identify the relative importance of
these mechanisms. For this purpose, it would be necessary to have access to high-
frequency individual-level data on traﬃc violations, e.g. speeding, seat belt use, or
alcohol consumption, which are not currently in the public domain.
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Figures
Figure C.1: Driving Licenses Suspended by the Judiciary Authority
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Source: Spanish Directorate General for Traﬃc (2009).
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Figure C.2: Placebo Test: Moving the Policy to 2000
Donor Pool: All Countries
0
5
10
15
20
De
at
hs
 p
er
 1
00
00
0 
pe
op
le
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
year
Spain Synthetic Spain
Donor Pool: No PPS, or adopted before 1996
0
5
10
15
20
De
at
hs
 p
er
 1
00
00
0 
pe
op
le
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
year
Spain Synthetic Spain
Notes: In the top figure, we construct the synthetic control using all EU-15 countries excluding
Spain. For the bottom panel, we use only the 8 countries without a penalty points system (PPS)
and those that adopted it before 1996. The vertical dotted line indicates that the policy is assumed
to have been enacted the year 2000 in Spain for this placebo test.
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Figure C.3: Eﬀect of PPS in Spain vs. Placebo Eﬀects in Other Countries
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Notes: This figure shows the gap between road deaths per 100,000 people in a country vs. its
synthetic control, assuming that a penalty points system (PPS) was enacted in the year 2006
(marked by the vertical dotted line). The policy was only enacted in that year for Spain, whereas
the other eight countries shown in the figure either do not have a penalty points system (PPS) or
adopted it before 1996. For this countries, this is just a placebo exercise and we would expect the
gap to be zero.
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Figure C.4: Road Deaths over Time: Spain vs. “synthetic” Spain (excluding from the Donor Pool one Country at the Time)
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Figure C.5: Road Expenditure in Spain
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Notes: The top figure shows the evolution of road expenditure in new construction in Spain. The
bottom figure shows the evolution of road expenditure in maintenance in Spain.
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Figure C.6: GDP per capita in Spain
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Tables
Table C.1: Licenses Suspended by the Judiciary Authority
Length of Suspension
Year < 6 months 6 months - 1 year 1 year - 3 years > 3 years Total
2000 5,049 449 25,413 142 31,053
2001 3,511 280 26,826 153 30,770
2002 2,531 188 26,475 160 29,354
2003 1,837 2,888 26,164 170 31,059
2004 1,248 9,461 25,046 237 35,992
2005 817 11,176 21,305 211 33.509
2006 657 13,207 18,654 219 32,737
2007 632 16,627 19,902 314 37,475
2008 707 24,030 23,397 323 48,457
2009 675 29,199 26,356 440 56,670
Source: Spanish Directorate General for Traﬃc (2009).
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Table C.2: Country weights for Synthetic Spain: Placebo Test
Donor Pool
Country All No PPS (or adopted
countries before 1996)
Austria 0 -
Belgium 0.193 0.051
Denmark 0 -
Finland 0.073 0.047
France 0 0.323
Germany 0 0.260
Greece 0.157 0.319
Ireland 0.009 -
Italy 0.197 -
Luxembourg 0 -
Netherlands 0 -
Portugal 0.282 0
Sweden 0 0
United Kingdom 0.089 0
Notes: This table reports the weights assigned to each country using the synthetic control method
explained in Section 3.3. In this case, we conduct a placebo test on which we move the policy
to year 2000. By construction, the weights are nonnegative and must add up to one. In the first
column, the pool of donors contains all EU-15 countries excluding Spain. In the second column,
the pool of donors contains the subset of countries that have never adopted a penalty points system
(PPS) or adopted it before the year 1996.
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Table C.3: Country weights for Synthetic Spain: Excluding from the Donor Pool one
Country at the Time
PANEL A
Country Excluded from the Donor Pool
Country Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece
Austria - 0 0 0 0 0 0
Belgium 0.196 - 0.044 0.241 0.197 0.244 0.261
Denmark 0 0 - 0 0 0 0
Finland 0 0.023 0 - 0 0 0
France 0 0.027 0.134 0 - 0 0
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 - 0
Greece 0.079 0.051 0 0.044 0.055 0.077 -
Ireland 0.048 0.129 0.006 0 0.020 0 0.006
Italy 0.152 0.184 0.233 0.165 0.172 0.160 0.211
Luxembourg 0.026 0.034 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.011
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Portugal 0.373 0.427 0.461 0.369 0.381 0.347 0.396
Sweden 0.126 0.090 0.114 0.175 0.164 0.164 0.115
United Kingdom 0 0.036 0 0 0.003 0 0
PANEL B
Country Excluded from the Donor Pool
Country Ireland Italy Luxem. Nether. Portugal Sweden UK
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Belgium 0.140 0.285 0.159 0.236 0.352 0.307 0.244
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0.016 0
France 0.128 0.114 0.085 0 0.334 0.111 0
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Greece 0.007 0.098 0.072 0.052 0.214 0.123 0.067
Ireland - 0 0 0 0.003 0.030 0
Italy 0.178 - 0.180 0.173 0.032 0 0.172
Luxembourg 0 0 - 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 0 0 0 - 0 0.190 0
Portugal 0.407 0.289 0.353 0.374 - 0.222 0.358
Sweden 0.140 0.125 0.135 0.165 0 - 0.159
United Kingdom 0 0.090 0.0170 0 0.066 0 -
Notes: This table reports the weights assigned to each country using the synthetic control method
explained in Section 3.3. In this case, we take out from the donor pool one country at the time.
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